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Q To take the property back? 
A To take the property back. 
Q And at that time,the condemnation case had been 
started; hadn't it? 
A It had started, yes. 
Q And you know that this power line was going 
through the property in about this location? (Indicating.) 
A Yes. 
Q Did you not? 
A Yes. 
Q And you knew what kind of a power line it was? 
A No. I didn't know all extent to the whole thing, 
no. 
Q Now, after you notified Mr. Elder to make the 
payment or you would take the property back, did he ever 
attempt to delay you in taking the property back? 
A No, he didn't. 
Q did Mr. Jenkins and his group ever attempt to 
delay you? 
A No. 
Q Now, as I understand it, you recorded your Quit 
Claim Deed on February 2nd of 1984; is that right? 
A Was it the 3rd or 2nd? I thought it was the 3rd. 
Q Yes. 
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A 
Q 
acres? 
A 
Q 
I recorded it, yes. 
And that Quit-Claim Deed covered the entire 76 
That's right. 
And then over a year later in 1985, as I 
understand it, this deed rom Mr. Elder to Mr. Didericksen 
/as recorded; is that right? 
A 
Q 
A 
out then 
Q 
A 
Q 
Malnar, < 
A 
Q 
A 
I just -
Q 
property-
broker? 
A 
Q 
buyers t.< 
I don't know, because I just found out. 
You just saw that a day or two ago? 
I may have found out a little quicker, but I found 
what I testified. 
Just recently then? 
Yes. 
Now, after you took the property back, Mrs. 
did you ever make any effort to sell it? 
No. 
Did you ever list the property with anyone? 
This condemnation was coming up and all this, and 
My question is; at any time since you took the 
back, did you list the property with a real estate 
No, I did not. 
Have you attempted in any way to contact potential 
D buy the property? 
1 A to buy it back? 
2 I Q Yes 
3 I A No 
M I Q Have you ever made any attempts at all to sell the 
- property :r any part of the property? 
fi i A No. 
- I Q Have you at any time since February 2nd of 1983, 
g either personally or through your attorney, notified anyone; 
9 Mr. Elder or Mr. Perkins or any member of Iv s group — 
A In 1983, I didn't even have the property back or 
nothing. 
Q Well, excuse me. Let me restate that. At any 
tine since February 3rd of 19 84, have you contacted Mr. 
Elder or Mr. Jenkins or any member of Mr. Jenkins' group; or 
Mr. Labrum or Mr. BelIon or Mr. Dastrup — to let them know 
that you thought there was a cloud on the title and to ask 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
.. th.m to do something about it? 
18 
19 
A No. I didn't see any concern — I mean — I 
didn't see any reason to do that. I didn't see that that 
M I would help any matter. 
.. , Q And you haven't started any lawsuit during that 
„ I period of time to clear up your title? 
A No. I haven't started yet. I've got a million 
«. I two other things to do on it, 
-c Q Have you obtained a title report from the title 
ooo 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ARVIN L. BELLON, MAURINE G. 
BELLON, B. CURTIS DA5TRUP, 
LANIS B. DASTRUP, and 
A. LABRUM & SONS, INC., 
Plaintiffs/Respondents, 
vs. 
MARVEL L. MALNAR, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
JURISDICTION STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction over this case is conferred upon this 
Court by Section 78-2-3(j), Utah Code Annotated (1989). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an Appeal from a final judgment after trial 
held in the Seventh District Court of Duchesne County, the 
Honorable Boyd Bunnell presiding. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The issues Defendant/Appellant Malnar appeals are set 
forth in the Brief of Appellant, Plaintiffs/Respondents Arvin L. 
Bellon, et al . , cross appeal the trial court's denial of 
prejudgment interest on its award of equitable restitution to 
them. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Sections 78-34-9 and 11, Utah Code Annotated (1953) and 
R\ile 19(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are determinative 
in part of the issues of 1) the right of Bellon's predecessor to 
BRIEF AND CROSS-
APPEAL OF RESPONDENTS 
Case No. 88-0226 
the eminent domain award and 2) title to the six (6) acres. 
These statutes and this rule are set forth in full in Addenda G 
and H to this Brief and Cross Appeal of Respondents. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASS 
A. Nature of The Case 
This is an action for equitable restitution of monies 
declared forfeited by Malnar under a real estate contract for the 
sale of land in Duchesne County, State of Utah. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
This action was commenced July 11, 1985 by Plaintiffs 
Clark Jenkins, Ferron C. Elder, Richard McCarver, Thomas C. 
Mabey, and J. McRay Johnson (hereinafter "Jenkins, et al."). (R. 
001-005) Defendant/Appellant, Marvel L. Malnar (hereinafter 
"Malnar")/ answered on September 11, 1985. (R. 013-015) The 
case was certified ready for trial on September 30, 1986. (R. 
017-018) 
On February 12, 1987, Plaintiffs/Respondents, Arvin L. 
Bellon, Maurine G. Bellon, B. Curtis Dastrup, Lanis B. Dastrup 
and A. Labrum and Sons, Inc. (hereinafter "Bellon"), moved to be 
substituted as Plaintiffs, based upon an assignment of claims and 
catise of action executed January 30, 1987. (R. 021-033) Malnar 
stipulated to the substitution. (R. 033-034) The Order 
substituting Bellon as plaintiff was entered May 2, 1987. (R. 
041-042) 
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C. Disposition in The Lower Court 
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D. Relevant Facts 
1. The individual Plaintiffs/Respondents are 
residents of Duchesne County, State of Utah, and 
Plaintiff/Respondent, A. Labrum & Sons, Inc., is a corporation 
organized and existing under the laws of the State of Utah, with 
its principal office and place of business in Duschesne County, 
Utah. (Finding No, 1, R. 129) 
2. Appellant/Defendant Malnar is a resident of 
Duchesne County, State of Utah. (Finding No. 2, R. 129) 
3. On July 23, 1980 Malnar, as seller, and Ferron 
Elder (hereinafter "Elder"), as buyer, entered into an earnest 
money agreement for the purchase and sale of six acres of land in 
Duchesne County, State of Utah, for a total purchase price of 
$9,000, or $1,500 per acre. The agreement was subject to Elder 
signing an option to purchase the remaining seventy (70) acres in 
the parcel and Malnar obtaining a release of ten (10) acres by 
warranty deed from Bow Valley, the party from whom Malnar was 
purchasing the property under contract. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3, 
lines 25-26, admitted Tr. 32 - Addendum "A") 
4. Malnar, as seller, and Elder, as buyer, entered 
into a second earnest money agreement for the sale and purchase 
of the entire seventy-six (76) acres. That earnest money 
agreement was dated December 18, 1980 at the top. Elder agreed 
to pay $2,000 per acre, instead of $1,500. The earnest money 
4 
agreement provided for the release of six (6) acres of said 
seventy-six (76) acre tract to Elder at the time of closing. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 4, admitted Tr. 35 - Addendum "B") 
5. On December 19, 1980, Malnar and Elder entered 
into a real estate contract for the sale and purchase of said 
seventy-six (76) acres; however, the real estate contract made no 
mention of the release to Elder of the six (6) acre parcel at 
closing. Based upon Elder agreeing in the December 18 earnest 
money to pay $2,000 per acre, instead of $1,500, Malnar gave 
Elder a warranty deed to the six (6) acre parcel. 
Mr. Madsen: When did you pay for that 
six acres? 
Mr. Elder: At the time of the agreement 
— and this was verbal — Fern Oberhansly was 
at the closing. And this was verbal — was 
that the six acres was given to me for the— 
because I was -- because I agreed to pay, 
instead of $1,500 an acre, $2,000 an acre. 
And I was given clear, free title. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 5, admitted Tr. 36; Brief of Appellant, 
Addendum 3; Tr. 45) 
6. On the same date, to wit: December 19, 1980, 
Malnar and Elder executed an escrow agreement with First Security 
Bank of Utah, Roosevelt office, as escrow agent, and deposited 
with the agent said real estate contract, a copy of a notice of 
Elder!s interest in the seventy-six (76) acres dated December 19, 
1980, and a quit-claim deed from Elder to Malnar dated December 
19, 1980, and covering the entire seventy-six (76) acre tract. 
5 
The escrow agreement referred to a warranty deed. Sheila Houtz, 
operations officer with First Security Bank, the escrow agent, 
testified there was a warranty deed from Malnar to Elder 
concerning the entire property (76 acres) in the escrow file. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 27, admitted Tr. 78, and Tr. 78-79-
Addendum "C") 
7. At the closing, the title company closing officer, 
Fern Oberhansly, typed the warranty deed covering the six acres 
and Malnar signed it. Oberhansly recorded the warranty deed to 
the six acres and had it mailed it to Elder. (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 11, admitted Tr. 37, and Tr. 70-71 - Addendum "D") 
8. The purchase price for the seventy-six (76) acres 
was ONE HUNDRED FIFTY-TWO THOUSAND DOLLARS ($152,000.00). The 
real estate contract called for a down payment of TWENTY-THREE 
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($23,500.00) at closing, interest 
at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum on the unpaid balance, 
and subsequent annual payments. (Finding No. 7, R. 132) 
9. On December 31, 1980, Elder assigned his interest 
in the real estate contract with Malnar to Jenkins, et al. , by 
means of a contract of sale covering the same seventy-six (76) 
acre tract as was sold by Malnar to Elder. (Finding No. 8, R. 
132) 
10. On January 30, 1987, Jenkins, et al., assigned all 
of their right, title and interest in and to the real estate 
6 
contract with Malnar and the seventy-six (76) acres described 
therein to Bellon for good and valuable consideration, Malnar 
stipulated that Bellon be substituted as Plaintiff. (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 19, admitted Tr. 40, R. 026-032, 033-034, 041-042-
Addendum "E") 
11. Elder defaulted on the December 19, 1980, real 
estate contract with Malnar by failing to make the annual payment 
due on December 19, 1983, or within thirty (30) days thereafter. 
On January 19, 1984, Malnar gave Elder notice of default and 
Elder failed to cure the default within the time and as provided 
by said real estate contract. (Finding No. 10, R. 132) 
12. On February 3, 1984, in accordance with the terms 
of the December 19, 1980, real estate contract and the said 
escrow agreement, Malnar requested that the escrow agent, First 
Security Bank of Utah, release to her the escrow documents and on 
the same date, Malnar recorded the quit-claim deed from Elder 
conveying back to her the entire seventy-six (76) acres. 
(Finding No. 11, R. 133) 
13. The following payments were made by Elder to 
Malnar on the December 19, 1980, real estate contract, on or 
about the following dates, to wit: 
Date Principal Interest Total 
12/19/80 $23,500.00 -0- $23,500.00 
01/21/82 12,403.81 $13,941.37 26,345.18 
02/01/83 14,226.65 12,118.53 26,345.18 
7 
Total $50,130,46 $26,059.90 $76,190,36 
(Finding No. 12, R. 133) 
14. The principal balance owing to Malnar by Elder 
after the February 1, 1983, payment was $101,919.54, after 
payment of escrow fees and expenses and with interest paid to 
said date, (Finding No. 13, R. 133) 
15. On September 19, 1982, Deseret Generation & 
Transmission Cooperative (hereinafter "Deseret") commenced 
eminent domain proceedings for the purpose of acquiring an 
easement across 5.22 acres of the seventy-six (76) acres covered 
by the December 19, 1980, contract and on October 18, 1982, an 
order of immediate occupancy was entered and a required cash 
deposit paid into court by Deseret for the landowner. (Finding 
No. 14, R. 133-134, Addendum "F") 
16. On March 7, 1985, Malnar and Bellon's assignors, 
to wit: Elder and Jenkins, et al. , entered into a written 
stipulation in the eminent domain proceeding, by the terms of 
which they agreed that Malnar was to receive all damages awarded 
in said eminent domain action and that Bellon's said assignors1 
interest in the seventy-six (76) acres would be limited to a 
claim against Malnar for equitable restitution of monies 
forfeited under the December 19, 1980, real estate contract. 
(Finding No. 15, R. 134) 
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17. On or about the 30th day of March, 1985, Malnar 
received the sum of NINE THOUSAND SEVENTY-FIVE DOLLARS 
($9,075.00) and on or about the 30th day of December, 1986, she 
received the sum of THIRTY-TWO THOUSAND DOLLARS ($32,000.00), for 
a total of FORTY-ONE THOUSAND SEVENTY-FIVE DOLLARS ($41,075.00) 
from said eminent domain proceedings. She expended, by way of 
costs and attorney's fees in said action, the sum of SIX THOUSAND 
DOLLARS ($6,000.00), giving her net receipts from the eminent 
domain proceedings of THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND SEVENTY FIVE DOLLARS 
($35,075.00). (Finding No. 16, R. 134) 
18. Bellonfs MAI appraiser, Jud Harward, determined 
the value of the 76 acres to be $180,000 on February 3, 1984. 
Harward appraised the six (6) acres at $30,000 and the remaining 
70 at $150,000. (Tr. 135, 158-164, 166, 169, 170-171) 
19. Malnar acknowledges that the contract price was 
$152,000 (Brief of Appellant, p. 4). Malnar acknowledges 
receiving $50,130.46 principal and $26,059.90 interest under the 
December 19, 1980 contract with Elder. (Ibid., pp. 4-5, 29, 35) 
Malnar acknowledges receiving $35,075 as a net recovery in the 
eminent domain action. (Ibid., pp. 8-9) Malnar acknowledges 
taking delivery of the escrowed quit claim deed and recording it 
on February 3, 1984. (Ibid.# p. 5) 
20. The trial court found: 
1 9 . Ma lna r p a i d t h e t o t a l sum of ONE 
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY-FOUR AND 
9 
52/100 DOLLARS ($1,774.52) in real property 
taxes and water assessments which should have 
been paid by Elder. 
(Finding No. 19, R. 135) The testimony and exhibits do not 
disclose the precise basis for the trial court's finding 
regarding this or any other possible amount. 
21. Malnar and/or Elder executed seven (7) 
contemporaneous instruments as part of the transaction for the 
sale and purchase of the subject property: 
1) An earnest money agreement bearing the date 
December 18, 1980 at the top (Addendum "B"); 
2) The December 19, 1980 real estate contract 
(Addendum "C"; Addendum 3 to Brief of Appellant); 
3) An escrow agreement (Addendum "C"); 
4) A warranty deed placed in escrow concerning 
the entire property (76 acres) (Addendum "C"); 
5) A notice of interest (Addendum "C"); 
6) A quit claim deed (Plaintiff!s Exhibit 10, 
admitted Tr. 42 - Addendum "I"); 
7) A warranty deed concerning the six (6) acres 
(Addendum "D"). 
22. It was the intent of Malnar and Elder that Elder 
receive title to the six (6) acre parcel at closing on December 
19, 1980. The closing officer specially prepared the warranty 
deed to the six acres at the closing. Malnar signed it. The 
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closing agent recorded it and had it mailed to Elder. (Relevant 
Facts Nos. 5 and 7 hereinabove; Tr. 35-36, 44, and 47, lines 1-5) 
This was consistent with the December 18, 1980 earnest money 
agreement. (Plaintiff's Exhibit "B", lines 22-23) Elder treated 
the six (6) acres as his own. (Tr. 48-49, 51, 108-109, 116, 126-
127) 
23. Despite the collateral agreement at closing 
regarding the six (6) acres, the legal description to the entire 
seventy-six (76) acres was continued in the real estate contract, 
and the escrowed warranty and quit claim deeds covering the 
remaining seventy (70) acres. (Addenda "C" and "I") 
24. The only way that the trial court could equitably 
calculate the damage to Malnar, by reason of the breach of the 
real estate contract by Elder, was to use the loss of interest 
approach. Rental value of the real property in question was hard 
to assess because of the problems relative to the legal title to 
the six (6) acres and the existence of the eminent domain suit 
which was initiated during the time that the real estate contract 
was in force. In calculating her actual damages the trial court 
found that Malnar was entitled to retain the interest she 
received under the real estate contract on January 21, 1982 and 
February 1, 1983. In addition thereto, she was entitled to 
interest on the unpaid balance of said contract, from February 1, 
1983, to February 3, 1984, in the amount of TEN THOUSAND TWO 
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HUNDRED FORTY-SEVEN AND 30/100 DOLLARS ($10,247,80), (Finding 
No. 23, R. 137) 
25. Based upon finding No. 23, (contract interest of 
$36,307.70 to February 3, 1984), which Mainar does not dispute, 
together with $1,774.52 in tax and water assessments and $2,000 
in lost profits, the trial court computed Mainar1s actual damages 
to be $40,082.22: 
Interest paid under the 
December 19, 1980 
real estate contract $ 26,059.90 
Intei^est due to February 
3, 1984 10,247.30 
Taxes and water assess-
ments paid by Mainar 
for Eider 1,774.5 2 
Loss of advantageous 
bargain 2,000.00 
$ 40,082.22 
The amounts she acknowledges receiving as purchase money and 
eminent domain proceeds totalled $111,265.36: 
Principal $ 50,130.46 
Interest 26,059 . 50 
Eminent domain 
proceeds 35,075.00 
/*.•« * * / • * / » * " /••»/"» 
In addition, Mainar received seventy (70) acres back which the 
trial court found to be valued at $150,000. (Relevant Fact No. 
18 above) 
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The difference between the amounts she acknowledges 
receiving, $111,265.36, and her actual damages, $40,082.22, was 
$71,183.14. The trial court determined the $111,265.36 to be 
grossly excessive and disproportionate to her actual damages of 
$40,082.22. The trial court ordered Malnar to pay Bellon the 
difference as equitable restitution, to wit: $71,183.14. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
On February 3, 1984, Malnar terminated the December 19, 
1980 real estate contract in accordance with its paragraph 12(a). 
The trial court properly calculated Malnar!s actual damages as of 
that date. 
Malnar and Elder executed seven (7) contemporaneous 
instruments in the course of the transaction for the sale and 
purchase of the seventy-six (75) acres. One of those 
instruments, the warranty deed from Malnar to Elder covering the 
six (6) acres, reflected a collateral agreement between Malnar 
and Elder for the release of that six (6)-acre parcel in exchange 
for Elder agreeing to pay $2,000 per acre, instead of $1,500 for 
the seventy-six (76) acres. The trial court properly determined 
the intent of Malnar and Elder that Elder own the six (6) acres 
by construing the contemporaneous documents in the light of the 
individual circumstances and equities presented. 
The trial court correctly determined Malnar!s actual 
damages to be: 
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Interest paid Malnar under 
the December 19, 1980 
real estate contract $ 26,059.90 
Interest due to February 
3, 1984 10,247.80 
Taxes and water assess-
ments paid by Malnar 
for Elder " 1,774.52 
Loss of advantageous 
bargain 2,000.00 
$ 40,082.22 
Malnar received $111,265.36 which she seeks to be 
declared forfeit under the contract: 
Principal $ 50,130.46 
Interest 26,059.50 
Eminent domain 
proceeds 35,075.00 
$111,265.36 
Bellon's predecessors, Elder and Jenkins, et al., were 
owners in lawful possession of the seventy-six (76) acres on the 
date of the taking in the related eminent domain action, October 
18, 1982. The trial court correctly determined that Beilon, as 
lawful assignee of the predecessor!s claims and cause of action, 
was entitled to credit for Malnarfs receipt of the $35,075 
eminent domain award. 
The trial court properly determined that the 
$111,265.36 Malnar declared forfeit was grossly excessive and 
disproportionate to her actual damages of $40,082.22. The trial 
court properly ordered Malnar to make equitable restitution to 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I, 
THE EVIDENCE PREPONDERATES IN FAVOR 
OF THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT 
MALNAR S U S T A I N E D $ 4 0 , 08 2 , 2 2 IN 
ACTUAL DAMAGES, 
This l^r a suit In equity* In Jensen v, Bi'Luf« * j -: 
1" * * ~ revi ewed :^- .>-,,": ^- ~ j" *._*-'
 Jw •- ^  
equ-.y Labtrs. Justice Oaks wrote: 
• , Since appeal in ay be 1: tad DI i, tl i,e 
facts as well as the law in equity cases, It 
is our duty,, when called upon, to weigh the 
facts as well as to review the law. Utah 
Constitution, Art, VIII, § 9 ; Utah R.Civ.?. 
72(a) ; Nelson y, Nelson,, 30 Utah 2d 80, 513 
P.2 d 1011 (1973); Prowltt y. Lunt, 103 u t ai • 
• 574, 137 P. 2d 361 (1943)", 
A l t h o u g h t h i s C o u r t ' s s t a t e m e n t s of t h e 
s t a n d a r d of r e v i e w of f i n d i n g s of f a c t i n 
e q u i t y c a s e s h a v e v a r i e d c o n s i d e r a b l y , 
S t a n l e y v . S t a n l e y , 97 Utah 520 , 5 2 8 , 94 P . 2 d 
4 6 5 , 468 (1939) (Wolfe , J . , c o n c u r r i n g ) , i t 
i s m o s t commonly s a i d t h a t we r e v e r s e o n l y 
w h e n t h e e v i d e n c e c l e a r l y p r e p o n d e r a t e s 
a g a i n s t t h e f i n d i n g s of t h e t r i a l c o u r t . 
C r i m m l n s v . S i n t e n d s , U t a h , 636 P » 2d 478 
( 1 9 8 1 ) ; Utah County v . B a x t e r , Utai l, 635 P , 2d 
61 ( 1 9 8 1 ) ; P e t e r s o n v . C a r t e r , u t a i i, 579 P .2d 
329 ( 1 9 7 8 ) ; Paqano v . W a l k e r , U tah , 539 P .2d 
45 2 (19 7 5 ) ; Nokes v , C o n t i n e n t a l Mining & 
M i l l i n g Co, , " 6 U t a h 2d 1 7 7 , 308 P . 2d 954 
(19 5 7 ) ; M o l l e r u p v . Daynes -Beebe Music Co, , 
82 U t a h ' 2 9 9 , 24 P . 2 d 306 ( 1 9 3 3 ) , T h i s 
• p r i n c i p l e i s w e l l s t a t e d i n t h e p l u r a l i t y 
. o p i n i o n i i i Nokes v . C o n t i n e n t a l Mining ' & 
M i l l i n g Co,, , 6 U t a h 2d a t 17 8 -179 308 P . 2 d 
9 5 4 : 
V% _ 1 1 .. ... _ JC 
o e i i u n u i 
[T]he finding of the trial court will 
not be disturbed if the evidence 
preponderates in favor of the finding; 
nor, if the evidence thereon is evenly 
balanced or it is doubtful where the 
preponderance lies; nor, even if its 
weight is slightly against the finding 
of the trial court, but it will be 
overturned and another finding made only 
if the evidence clearly preponderates 
against his finding. 
In substance, this is the same standard 
applied in those cases which state that we 
reverse only when the trial court's finding 
is against the clear weight of the evidence. 
McBride v. McBride, Utah, 581 P . 2d 996 
(1978); Chevron Oil Co. v, Beaver County, 22 
Utah 2d 14 3, 449 P. 2d 989 ( 1 9 6 9 ) ; 
Metropolitan Investment Co. v, Sine, 14 Utah 
2d 36, 376 P.2d 940 (1962); Peterson v. 
Peterson, 112 Utah 554, 190 P.2d 135 (1948). 
639 P.2d at 151-152. 
Malnar appeals Findings Nos. 18, 24, 25 and 26 (Brief 
of Appellant, p. 17), Finding No. 19 (Ibid., p. 28), Finding No. 
9 (Ibid. , p. 37), Findings No. 20, 21 and 22 (Ibid. , p. 41), 
Findings No. 3, 4, 5 and 6 (Ibid. , p. 44) and Finding No. 17 
(Ibid., p. 45). Malnar fails to meet her burden to show that the 
evidence clearly preponderates against these trial court 
findings. Certain of the findings Malnar contests can be readily 
resolved. 
Finding No. 19 
With regard to Finding No. 19, Malnar states on page 28 
of her brief: 
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11 i F i n d i n cj N o . 1 9 11 i e { t r i a 1 ) 
C- : •' irt allowed a total of $1/774,52 for (taxes 
ai id water assessments), but the correct 
amount is $2,161.72, and failure to allow the 
full amount is assigned as error and is 
a p p a r e n 11 y . j i I s t a n o v e r s i g h t. 
However, Malnar presents no evidence which clearly preponderates 
against Finding No. 19, Finding 19 should be affirmed. 
Finding No. 9 
Wi t h r e g a r d t _• F i n d i n g No, * Mrilndi1 ^ t d t ^ s on J6. ; ^ 3*7 : 
_ r ~ i*'_! J. n (4 . 5" c i ' . *. . *** . . J„ •_ r,i 
d e f e n d a n t a s ^ i g n ^ a s ^ r VIJ i", \ 1.^ *i r . ^.1 ! r^-tii c 
f o a n d t h a t on - J a n u a r v 3 0 , 1 9 8 7 , p l a i n t i f f s ' 
n r e d e c e s s o r i5 d b s l g nt;d t o p l a i n t i f f s " a l l o f 
t h e i r r i g h t , t i t l e a n d i n t e r e s t i n a n d t o t h e 
r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t w i t h M a l n a r a n d t h e 
<5 & \ T ^  o f- v;—<, j v ' 7 6 ! ^ *"*V1 e s d e s c r i ' ' e d t r, ••? r e 1" 
Ma J. n a r s t i p u i a t *=* d 11i ct t B T1 ! i«J *. b *r? s • J b s c 11 u T. -^ d. a t> ? 1 a i 111 i _[ f, TT d s 
p r a y ed r' ' u 51-1 i o n ' s M* • 11 uu f f„ - ?\ib*; r : r a t i o n .nc.;, Mo • > - ^ a s 
g r o u : i ue U LI p o n t h e A t> ^ ] nin. e n t - _ _ J. I m s ar» J a. u s e (~. -.., \ 1 o n 
*±n t *z?red among F I d e r " ^ n k - i n s , *r? •". •* *>id 3*- 11 uc:. * r - 2 6 — 034 ) 
p r efju< id e r c i t e s d g a i u b i F i e l d i n g . ^ . F i n d i n g 1 . - . _ s h - j u i d b e 
r* liiCi ilif,{S N o s . 3 4 J ciiid 6 
W i l l i I ' ^ u m d Lv F j - n d i n y i j N o . o ,- *±, 5 cuid 6 , M a l n a r 
s t a t e s on p a a e 4-* : 
The l o w e r Cour t , i n F i n d i n g s of Fctct Nus , 
3 , 4 , 5 a n d 6 p u r p o r t e d t o f i n d t h a t t h e 
P^* r I,M<-. i !T>, t i~- was er"'"f"*•••*r•"*c3 11 i t o f , : "i..; MinnHr1 
18, 1980 and led up to the final contract, 
but those findings are also assigned as error 
by defendant. 
The December 18, 1980 earnest money agreement is included 
herewith as Addendum !!B!! . Malnar asserts the earnest money 
agreement was not signed until December 19 and impliedly 
maintains this somehow evidences that the earnest money agreement 
did not lead up to the final December 19, 1980 real estate 
contract. Malnar1s "evidence" clearly does not preponderate 
against Findings No. 3, 4, 5 and 6. Findings Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6 
should be affirmed. 
A. Malnar!s Actual Damages Were Properly Calculated as of 
February 3, 1984, The Date She Terminated the Contract. 
Parties to a contract may introduce into it a provision 
that if one of them fails to fulfill certain specified terms, the 
other shall be entitled to treat the agreement as terminated. 17 
Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 495, p. 968. Paragraph 12 of the 
December 12, 1980 real estate contract was such a provision. 
Upon Elder's default, Malnar proceeded under Paragraph 12(a). 
In finding No. 11, which Malnar does not dispute, the 
trial court identified the date Malnar exercised her remedy upon 
breach and terminated the December 12, 1980 real estate contract: 
11. On February 3, 1984, in accordance 
with the terms of the December 19, 1980, real 
estate contract and the said escrow 
agreement, Malnar requested that the scrow 
agent, First Security Bank of Utah, release 
to her the escrow documents and on the same 
date, Malnar recorded the quit-claim deed 
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from Elder conveying back to her the entire 
seventy-six (76) acres. 
Malnar's termination of the real estate contract fixed the date 
to measure damages. 
As a general rule, the damages upon 
breach of contract are to be measured as of 
the date of the breach. Under this rule, 
fluctuations in value after breach do not 
affect the recovery allowed. (Footnotes 
omitted.) 
22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 52, p. 81. This rule applies in the 
case of breach of a contract to purchase real property. Vines v. 
Orchard Kills, Inc., 435 A. 2d 1022 (Conn. 1980); Zlrinsky v. 
Sheehan, 413 F.2d 481 (8th Cir. 1969); and Baffa v. Johnson, 216 
P.2d 13 (Ca. 1950). 
By implication, the Utah Supreme Court has also adopted 
the rule that a seller's damages are to be measured as of the 
date of the purchaser's breach. In Peck v. Judd, 325 P. 2d 712 
(Utah 1958), the trial court found that at the time the seller 
retook possession of the property, it had a reasonable market 
value of $40,000, down $35,000 from the contract price of 
$75,000. The Court wrote: 
. . . We are of the opinion that the finding 
of the value of the property when returned to 
plaintiffs is supported by the evidence. As 
heretofore observed there was evidence that 
the property was terribly run down and was 
not in as good condition when turned back as 
when received by the defendants in 1950. 
326 P.2d at p. 715. 
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The Case at Bar 
F i n d i n g No. 10, which Malnar does no t d i s p u t e , 
provides: 
10. Elder defaulted on the December 19, 
1930, real estate contract with Malnar by 
failing to make the annual payment due on 
December 19, 1983, or within thirty (30) days 
thereafter. On January 19, 1984, Malnar gave 
Elder notice of default and Elder failed to 
cure the default within the time and as 
provided by said real estate contract. 
Elder's breach continued until February 3, 1984, when Malnar 
obtained release of the quit claim deed and recorded it. Once 
the quit claim deed was recorded, Elder's breach was concluded. 
Hence, Malnarls damages should be measured as of February 3, 
1984, the last date of Elder's breach and the date Malnar took 
back fee ownership of the seventy (70) acres. 
B. The Evidence Preponderates in Favor of the Trial Court's 
Findings that Elder, not Malnar, Held Fee Title to the Six Acres 
at the Time of Elder's Default. 
The general rule is that in the absence of anything to 
indicate a contrary intention, instruments executed at the same 
time, by the same contracting parties, for the same purpose, and 
in the course of the same transaction will be considered and 
construed together, since they are, in the eyes of the law, one 
contract or instrument. Moreover, when two instruments are 
entered into between the same parties concerning the same subject 
matter, whether made simultaneously or on different days, they 
may, under some circumstances, be regarded as one contract and 
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construed together. A transaction constituting a contract must 
be considered as a whole, even though it consumed more than one 
day, the date of the writings constituting such transaction being 
immaterial. Construing contemporaneous instruments together 
means simply that if there are any provisions in one instrument 
limiting, explaining, or otherwise affecting the provisions of 
another, they will be given effect as between the parties 
themselves and all persons charged with notice so that the intent 
of the parties may be carried out and the whole agreement 
actually made may be effectuated. 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 
264, pp. 663-670. This rule pertains in Utah. 
In Thomas J. Peck & Sons, Inc. v. Lee Rock Products, 
Inc. , 515 P.2d 446 (Utah 1973), this Court affirmed the trial 
court's interlocutory ruling that a lease and "added option" were 
intended to be one integrated transaction. This Court wrote: 
. . . The most fundamental of (the basic-
principles of contract law with which the 
trial court appears to have been concerned) 
is that the meaning and effect to be given a 
contract depends upon the intent of the 
parties [Jensen's Used Cars v. Rice, 7 Utah 
2d 276, 323 P.2d 259]; and that this is to be 
ascertained by looking at the entire 
contract, and all of its parts in their 
relationship to each other; and this 
principle applies to whether they intended 
separate aspects of their contract to be 
severable, [Coppedqe v. Leiser, 71 Idaho 248, 
229 P.2d 977; Restatement of Contracts, 
Section 235], and that if this results in 
uncertainty, he may and should look to 
extraneous evidence concerning the background 
and surrounding circumstances in order to 
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make that determination. [Continental Bank &. 
Trust Co. v. Bybee, 6 Utah 2d 98, 306 P. 2d 
773] 
515 P.2d at 448. 
Likewise, in Baxter v. Stubbs, 620 P.2d 68 (Utah 1980), 
this Court wrote: 
We do not question the general proposition 
that when a deed is executed pursuant to 
preceding contract of sale it is generally 
presumed to merge the rights existing under 
the contract. However, the rule is not so 
all-encumpassing and exclusive as to prevent 
the parties from having collateral agreements 
concerning the same subject matter. As with 
any contract issue, the controlling inquiry 
is to determine the intention of the parties; 
and this includes the question of any merger. 
620 P. 2d at 69. (Footnotes omitted.) In Baxter, the parties 
entered into an agreement for the sale of a parcel of commercial 
property. A later addendum granted the seller a 25 percent 
interest in the venture. However the warranty deed the seller 
executed contained no mention of the seller retaining a 25 
percent interest in the property. 
In affirming the trial court, this Court found the 
evidence sufficient to sustain the finding that the seller was 
entitled to a 25 percent interest in the partnership assets. 
Chief Justice Crockett observed: 
In the instant situation, the 25 percent 
interest in the partnership had already been 
granted to the plaintiff by the addendum 
agreement. According to plaintiff's version 
of the evidence, the warranty deed was given 
in the carrying out of that plan, but was not 
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intended to divest her of her 25 percent 
interest in the partnership, whose assets 
included the property in dispute. 
Upon the basis of what has been said 
above, indulging the trial judge his 
prerogative of judging the credibility of the 
evidence, and according his findings and 
judgment the presumptions of verity to which 
they are entitled, we are not persuaded that 
the defendants have sustained their burden of 
showing that there was error which would 
justify upsetting them. 
Id. See also, Jensen v. Manila Corp. of the Church of Jesus, 565 
P.2d 63 (Utah 1977). 
Here 
It is undisputed that Malnar and Elder executed seven 
(7) contemporaneous instruments as part of the transaction for 
the sale and purchase of the subject property: 
1) An earnest money agreement; 
2) The real estate contract; 
3) An escrow agreement; 
4} A warranty deed concerning the entire property; 
5) A warranty deed concerning the six (6) acres; 
6) A notice of interest; and 
7) A quit-claim deed. 
(Relevant Facts Nos. 4, 5, 6 and 7) 
All bore the date December 19, 1930, except the earnest money 
agreement. The trial court found it was entered into on December 
18, 1980; it bore that date at the top. Malnar claims on page 44 
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of her Brief of Appellant that the earnest money agreement was 
not signed until December 19, 1980. So much the better. 
It cannot be disputed that the seven contemporaneous 
instruments were intended to be one integrated transaction. They 
were executed at or about the same time, by the same parties, for 
the same purpose and in the course of the same transaction. When 
it made its findings regarding ownershp of the six (6) acres, the 
trial court here appears to have been concerned with that same 
most fundamental principle of contract law that concerned the 
trial court in Peck, supra: to ascertain the intent of the 
parties by looking at all transaction documents together with the 
surrounding circumstances. 
Findings Nos. 20, 21 and 2 2 
With regard to Findings No. 20, 21 and 22, Malnar 
states on page 41: 
In Findings of Fact Nos. 20, 21 and 22 
the (trial) Court found that plaintiffs were 
entitled to the six acres, and those findings 
are assigned as error. 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are Addendum 1 to the 
Brief of Appellant. 
Malnar argues that paragraph 17 of the real estate 
contract and an absence of evidence that Elder made any payments 
thereunder ipso facto compel a finding that the warranty deed 
from Malnar to Elder "was erroneously recorded by the escrow 
agent shortly after closing." In fact, paragraph 17 referred to 
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the release of acreage beyond the ten (10) acres of which Malnar 
had obtained release from Bow Valley and from which ten (10) 
acres Malnar conveyed the six (6) acres to Elder by warranty deed 
at the time of closing, (Addendum "B", lines 22-26) 
Malnar further urges that because the legal description 
of the 76 acres was carried forward to the March 5, 1985 
stipulation in the eminent domain action, the trial court erred 
in finding Elder to be the owner of the six acres at the time of 
default. This "evidence" simply does not clearly preponderate 
against the trial court!s findings regarding the six (6) acres. 
The contemporaneous instrument and conduct evidence 
expressly set forth in Finding No, 20 preponderates in favor of 
the trial court's findings as to the intent of the parties and 
that Elder, not Malnar, owned fee title to the six acres at the 
time of default. Malnar!s extravagant claim for damages of 
$30,000.00 for "loss of the six acres" (Brief of Appellant, p. 
28) should be denied. Findings Nos. 20, 21 and 22 should be 
affirmed. 
C. The Trial Court Correctly Computed Malnar's Actual Damages, 
The broad doctrine that there is no definite rule by 
which to determine whether a contractual stipulation is for a 
penalty or liquidated damages has been frequently applied in 
connection with the interpretation of provisions in land 
contracts for the forfeiture of payments. Each case is 
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ultimately determined on its individual circumstances and 
equities. Provision in Land Contract for Forfeiture of Payments 
as One for Liquidated Damages or Penalty, 6 A.L.R. 2d 1401, § 3, 
p. 1411. 
In Perkins v. Spencer, 243 P.2d 446 (Utah 1942), the 
Utah Supreme Court set forth the damages a seller would be 
entitled to recover or retain as damages in the case of breach of 
a contract to purchase real property. 
The vendors are entitled to any loss 
occasioned them by any of these factors: 
(1) Loss of advantageous bargain; 
(2) Any damage to or depreciation of 
the property; 
(3) Any decline in value due to change 
in market value of the property not 
allowed for in items Nos. 1 and 2; 
and 
(4) For the fair rental value of the 
property. 
The total of such sums should be 
deducted from the total amount paid in, plus 
any improvements for which it would be fair 
to allow recovery, and any remaining 
difference awarded to the plaintiffs. 
243 P.2d at pp. 451-452. 
Malnar argues for a rigid application of Perkins v. 
Spencer. In Warner v. Rasmussen, 704 P.2d 559 (Utah 1985), Chief 
Justice Hall wrote: 
This Court has previously addressed the 
contention that Perkins precluded alternative 
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methods of calculating actual damages from 
breach of a land sales contract. In Johnson 
v. Carmen, [572 P. 2d 371 (Utah 1977)3 we 
upheld a ruling that a forfeiture clause in a 
uniform real estate contract was 
unenforceable where a portion of the sellers' 
actual damages was measured by interest at 
the contract rate of 8 1/2% per annum on the 
unpaid balance of the contract. Our response 
there applies equally here: "Although [the 
factors set forth in Perkins] are reasonable 
factors to determine damages, they were not 
meant to be a rigid formula to be applied 
mechanically in every case. In determining 
equitable damages, the trial court may use 
whatever factors it finds most appropriate to 
achieve justice." [572 P.2d at 374.] 
704 P. 2d at 562. (Footnote 7 omitted.) As in Warner, the trial 
court here used the factors it found most appropriate to achieve 
justice. 
Loss of Advantageous Bargain 
In their post-trial memoranda to the trial court, 
Bellon argued that Malnar's actual damages consisted only of 
$3,123.29 for the fair rental value of agricultural land and 
$1,774.52 for taxes and water assessments which accrued during 
the life of the contract and which Malnar paid on Elder's behalf. 
(R. 48-77) However, the trial court determined Malnar1s actual 
damages dif ferently. 
In Park Valley Corp. v. Bagley, 635 P.2d 65 (Utah 
1931), this Court reviewed the measure of damages for loss of 
advantageous bargain. Justice Howe wrote: 
I n P e r k i n s v . Spenc e r , s u p r a , we 
designated the items for which the s e l l e r was 
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entitled to be compensated when the court 
determines whether the amount proposed to be 
forfeited is exorbitant. One of the items 
was the loss of an advantageous bargain. We 
elaborated on this item of damage in Cole v. 
Parker, 5 Utah 2d 263, 300 P.2d 623 (1956): 
Thus in the absence of a finding of 
fraud, the seller is entitled to be 
credited, in the computation of damage 
sustained because of the breach of 
contract the difference between the 
contract price and the price for which 
he can sell the forfeited property. The 
fact that, according to plaintiff's 
evidence, this amount exceeds the amount 
paid on the contract forecloses further 
inquiry as to whether or not the 
forfeiture provision of the contract 
properly assessed the actual damages 
suffered by the defendants. 
635 P.2d at 67. 
In Park V a l l e y , the c o n t r a c t p r i c e was $1,080,000. 
After the d e f e n d a n t s 1 d e f a u l t , the s e l l e r a c t u a l l y sold the 
p r o p e r t y fo r $ 9 3 5 , 0 0 0 , which was $145 ,000 l e s s than the 
de fendan t s had agreed to pay. This Court found the loss of 
bargain to be $145,000 and remanded for entry of an appropr ia te 
judgment. 
This Case 
The c o n t r a c t p r i c e he re i s u n d i s p u t e d : $152,000. 
However, Malnar d i spu tes the f a i r market value of the land she 
took back on February 3, 1984. 
Finding No. 17 
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With regard to Finding No. 17, Malnar states on page 45 
of her brief: 
In Finding No. 17 the (trial) Court 
found the 7 6 acres to have a fair market 
value of $180,000 at default in February 
1984, and that finding is assigned as error. 
Finding No. 17 provides: 
17. The fair market value of the 
SEVENTY-SIX (76) acres, as of February 3, 
1984, the date that Malnar took possession of 
said real property and recorded her Quit-
claim deed, was ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THOUSAND 
DOLLARS ($180,000.00), and the fair market 
value of the six (6) acres previously deeded 
from the seventy-six (76) acres to Elder in 
1 9 8 0 w a s T H I R T Y T H O U S A N D D O L L A R S 
($30,000.00), leaving a fair market value of 
the remaining seventy (70) acres as of that 
date of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND DOLLARS 
($150,000.00). 
Plaintiff's appraiser, Jud Harward, holds an MAI 
designation in the American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers. 
(Tr. 135) He testified that the subject property was increasing 
in value. In July 1980 it was worth $1,500 per acre. (Tr. 143) 
On December 18 and 19, 1980 it was worth $2,000 per acre. On 
December 30, 1980 it was worth $3,500 per acre. In the eminent 
domain proceedings, Judge Davidson found the value to be $4,000 
per acre on the date of the taking, October 18, 1982. (Tr. 144-
145; Addendum "F") 
Harward determined the value of the 76 acres to be 
$180,000 on February 3, 1984 (Tr. 169) His appraisal was based 
upon the highest and best use of the land as speculative 
residential development land and upon the fair market value as 
determined by comparable sales between willing buyers and willing 
sellers. (Tr. 158-164) Roosevelt City had given site plan 
approval for residential development. (Tr. 166) Harward 
analyzed in detail the effect of the power line easement on the 
three distinct segments of the 70 acres. (Tr. 169) Harward 
appraised the six acres at $30,000 and the remaining 70 at 
$150,000. (Tr. 170-171) 
Malnar testified in her own behalf that the property 
was worth $101,000 as of March 1985. (Tr. 261-262) A realtor 
who also testified in Malnar !s behalf valued the property at 
!!
 (s)omewhere in the value of $1,400 or l€?ss" per acre as of March 
1985. He testified that its highest and best use then "would be 
for a subdivision." (Tr. 327-328) He did not value the property 
as of early 1984 (Tr. 364-365) The realtor testified that 
through March 1984 there was an upward trend in the real estate 
market in general in Duchesne County which peaked in aboxit March 
1984. (Tr. 364) 
It cannot be disputed that the evidence preponderates 
in favor of the trial court's finding that the value of the land 
Malnar took back on February 3, 1984 was $150,000. The 
difference between the contract price ($152,000) and the fair 
market value of the land Malnar took back on February 3, 1984 
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($150,000) was $2,000, the amount the trial court found as 
damages for loss of advantageous bargain, 
Malnar!s formula for calculating damages for loss of 
advantageous bargain is novel, to say the least, and not 
supported by any case law: the difference between the contract 
balance and the value of the property. Malnar!s formula makes no 
sense whatsoever, unless the Court accepts Malnar!s erroneous 
March 1985 fig^^re for the value of the land, However, as 
demonstrated above, the fair market value of the land Malnar took 
back on February 3, 1984 was correctly found to be $150,000. 
In Utah State Med. Ass!n. v, Utah State Emp. Cred. Un«, 
655 P.2d 643 (Utah 1982), this Court stated the general rule 
regarding the purchaser's right to the benefit of any increase in 
the value of real property: 
In analyzing the law in this case, one 
finds that ordinarily, the purchaser is 
entitled to any benefit that may accrue to 
the property and must also bear any loss or 
depreciation to the property, absent the 
vendor's fault or negligence. 92 C.J.S. 
Vendor and Purchaser § 295. The purchaser 
bears such risks, based on the principle of 
equitable ownership, even when the vendor 
retains possession of the property subject to 
a conveyance at some later date. Jelco, Inc. 
v, Third Judicial District Court, 29 Utah 2d 
472, 511 P.2d 739 (1973); 77 Am.Jur.2d Ven. &. 
Pur. § 357. 
655 P.2d at 644. 
M a l n a r m i s r e p r e s e n t s t h e h o l d i n g i n B u t l e r v , 
W i l k i n s o n , 740 P . 2d 1244 (Utah 1987) as s t a n d i n g for her 
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proposition that a purchaser is not entitled to credit for any 
increase in the value of property in determining damages for loss 
of advantageous bargain. Butler was an action by a judgment 
creditor seeking to reach a vendeefs equity in real property. 
Butler holds that where a vendee fraudulently conveys his 
interest in land to the vendor who then sells the land to a bona 
fide purchaser, a creditor can recover the amount from the vendor 
in excess of the vendor's security interest under the contract 
with the vendee. Butler is both factually and legally inapposite 
to the case at bar. 
The trial court properly determined that Mainar 
sustained damages of $2,000 for loss of advantageous bargain. 
Contrary to Mainarfs assertions, the trial court did not order 
Mainar to reimburse BelIon for the increased value of the land. 
The equitable restitution the trial court correctly ordered is 
based upon the fact that Mainar received purchase money and 
eminent domain proceeds shockingly disproportionate to the actual 
damages she sustained under the real estate contract. 
Damage to or Depreciation of the Property 
The trial court justly accounted for Mainar's receipt 
of the eminent domain award. (See Point II.B. below.) As 
purchaser in good standing under the December 19, 1980 executory 
real estate contract, Elder was entitled to the award for the 
1982 taking or, alternatively, to rescission of the real estate 
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contract and return of the purchase money paid Malnar, 
$76,189.96, 
Malnar received $41,075 as the eminent domain award. 
She expended $6,000 in attorney's fees in that action. The trial 
court here credited Bellon with only $35,075 that Malnar received 
in eminent domain proceeds. The trial court properly accounted 
for Malnarfs $6,000 in attorney's fees. 
There is no theory or statute under which Malnar should 
again be credited with attorneys' fees expended to recover the 
eminent domain award to which Bellon's predecessors were 
entitled. This Court should reject out of hand Malnarfs claim 
for credit for her attorneys1 fees in the eminent domain action. 
Malnar fs realtor testified that the highest and best 
use of the land in March 1985, one year after the date of breach, 
"would be for a subdivision." (Tr. 327-328) Malnar argues that 
damages should be computed as of that date, rather than February 
3, 1984, the date she took the property back. 
Malnar testified at trial that the best use of the 
property in February 1988 would be for farming. (Tr. 258) On 
page 25 of her brief, Malnar argues that she is entitled to 
$30,000 as the cost to restore the property to her perception of 
its best use in 1988. Malnar can keep neither her dates nor the 
law straight. 
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The trial court properly computed Malnar!s actual 
damages as of February 3, 1984, There was no cost of restoration 
then or even in March 1935, Malnar is out of line in asking this 
Court to award her the purported cost to restore the Roosevelt 
City property to agricultural use in 1988. 
Decline in Value Due to Change in Market Value Not Allowed for in 
the Foregoing Elements of Damage 
0 n p a g e 2 5 o f h e r brief, M a 1 n a r a c knowle d g e s s h e 
sustained no actual damages in this regard. 
Interest or Fair Rental Value 
The trial court determined that Malnarfs actual damages 
from December 19, 1980 to February 3, 1984 consisted of $1,774.52 
for water and sewer assessments paid by Malnar for Elder, $2,000 
for loss of advantageous bargain and $36,307.70 in interest at 
the contract rate of 10%. Malnar claims she is entitled to 
additional interest to March 7, 1985 as "a reasonable time after 
return of the property to repair or resell the property." (Brief 
of Appellant, p. 26) However, Malnar presented no evidence at 
trial regarding repair or resale of the property within a 
reasonable time after she took the property back on February 3, 
1984. 
After Malnar took possession of the property on 
February 3, 1984 she never listed it for sale, contacted 
potential buyers or made any effort to sell it or any part of it, 
(Tr. 287-289 - Addendum "J") 
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On page 27 of her brief, Malnar asserts "the 70 acres 
was not marketable because of the Notice of Interest, at least 
until the Stipulation (Ex. 26), and in fact is not marketable to 
this date until the record interest of Eastern Utah Resources is 
terminated." Malnar fs claim of a cloud on the title is cut out 
of whole cloth. 
Malnar has never initiated any quiet title action 
regarding the property. Nor did she plead or adduce evidence at 
trial sufficient to establish and identify under U.R.C.P. IS (a) 
(Addendum H) an interest on the part of any person in whose 
absence complete relief could not be accorded among those already 
parties to the action. BelIon, as successors in interest of the 
majority of partners in Eastern Utah Resources ("EUR"), offered 
in the proceedings below to execute a release of the EUR Notice 
of Interest. (R. 85, lines 11-14) 
In short, there is no factual or legal basis for 
Malnar!s claim to any interest beyond February 3, 1984. Her cost 
to restore is based on her perception of the property's best use 
in 1988. She never made any attempt to resell. The claim of a 
cloud on the title is a red herring at best, which the trial 
court addressed. (Tr. 2.2-21 • Addendum "K") 
Malnar!s efforts to inflate her actual damages beyond 
those found by the trial court and to justify retaining the 
entire $111,265.36 she received, in addition to the $150,000 in 
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land, must fail. The evidence preponderates in favor of the 
trial court's findings as to the actual damages Malnar sustained 
as of February 3, 1984 and the equitable restitution to which 
Bellon is entitled: 
Principal paid by Elder on contract 
Interest paid by Elder on contract 
Eminent domain proceeds paid by 
Deseret Transmission 
Total 
Damages sustained by defendant 
Interest paid 
Interest accrued, but unpaid 
Unpaid taxes and water assessment 
Difference between contract price of 
$152,000 and value of property returned 2,000.00 
Total $ 40,082.22 
Differences awarded to plaintiffs $ 71,183.14 
This Court should affirm the trial court's findings. 
POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE PREPONDERATES IN FAVOR 
OF THE TRIAL COURTS FINDINGS THAT 
THE PURCHASE MONEY AND EMINENT 
DOMAIN AWARD MALNAR RECEIVED ARE 
G R O S S L Y E X C E S S I V E A N D 
DISPROPORTIONATE TO MALNAR!S ACTUAL 
DAMAGES AND THAT RESPONDENTS 
SUFFERED AN UNCONSCIONABLE 
FORFEITURE. 
A. The Tr ia l Court Jus t ly Accounted for Malnar !s Receipt of the 
Eminent Domain Award. 
I t i s well s e t t l e d that when there i s a 
t a k i n g of p r o p e r t y by eminent domain in 
compliance with law, i t i s the owner of the 
p r o p e r t y a t the time of the taking who i s 
e n t i t l e d to compensation. Consequently, if 
the parcel of land from which the taking i s 
$ 50,130.46 
26,059.50 
35,075.00 
111,265.36 
$ 26,059.90 
10,247.60 
1,774.52 
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made changes hands after the taking has 
occurred but before the compensation has been 
paid, the right to receive the compensation 
does not run with the land, but remains a 
personal claim of the person who was the 
owner at the time of the taking, or of his 
representatives. To carry this rule into 
effect, a certain point of time in the 
proceeding by which the land is taking must 
be agreed upon as constituting the puncturn 
temperis when the taking occurs, . , 
. . . In states in which condemnation is 
effected by judicial proceedings without 
payment as a prerequisite, the exact moment 
when the taking occurs depends largely upon 
the terms of the stautes fixing the time when 
the right to compensation becomes vested, 
But whatever the punctum temperis of the 
taking may be, it is the owner at such time 
who is entitled to the compensation. . . 
2 Nichols on Eminent Domain § 5.01 [4], at 5-29 to 5-35 (3d. Ed. 
1981) (Footnotes omitted; emphasis in original). See also, 
Riddock v. City of Helena, 687 P.2d 1386 (Mont. 1984). 
Sections 78-34-11 and 9, U.C.A. (1951) (Addendum r?G,!) 
create a rebuttable presumption as to the time of the taking in 
Utah: 
For the p u r p o s e of a s s e s s i n g 
compensation and damages, the right thereto 
shall be deemed to have accrued at the date 
of the service of summons, and its actual 
value at that date shall be the measure of 
compensation for all property to be actually 
taken, and the basis of damages to property 
not actually taken, but injuriously affected, 
in all cases where such damages are allowed, 
as provided in the next preceding section [§ 
78-34-10]. . (Emphasis added.) 
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See als£, Redevelopment Ag. of Salt Lake C. v. Mitsui Inv., Inc., 
522 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1974). Section 78-34-9, O.C.A. (1951), which 
concerns an order of immediate occupancy, provides in pertinent 
part: 
. , . If the motion is granted, the court or 
judge shall enter its order . . . . The 
rights of the just compensation for the land 
so taken or damaged shall vest in the parties 
entitled thereto . . . 
The Order of Immediate Occupancy was entered in the eminent 
domain action on October 18, 1982. (R. 133-134) The right to 
compensation vested in Bellon's predecessors at that time; they 
were the lawful owners then. 
The law is well settled in Utah that a purchaser of 
real property under an executory agreement acquires such an 
interest in the real property as to entitle the purchaser to any 
condemnation proceeds. Briqham City v. Rich, 97 P. 220 (Utah 
1908). The rule that the vendee, in the absence of a provision 
in the executory land sale contract concerning condemnation, is 
entitled to the condemnation award is universally recognized. 
Rights and Liabilities of Parties to Executory Contract for Sale 
of Land Taken by Eiminent Domain, 27 A.L.R. 3d 572, § 10(a). 
Even where the vendee fails to keep up his payments under the 
contract, his right to recover compensation from the condemnor is 
not affected. Ibid., § 10 (b), p. 595. 
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This rule has never been abrogated in Utah. In Jelco, 
Inc. v. Third Judicial District Court, 511 P.2d 733 (Utah 1973), 
the Utah Supreme Court reiterated the rule in Brie?ham City: 
. . . in the absence of an agreement to the 
contrary, where a condemnor takes land 
subject to an executory contract, it is the 
vendee who is normally entitled to any 
condemnation award for the land so taken. 
511 P.2d at p. 741. 
In C. & J. Industries, Inc. v. Bailey, 613 P.2d 53 
(Utah 1980), Justice Wilkins cited Jelco in writing: 
In such an executory contract the vendee 
(Jelco) acquires all of the incidents of 
ownership except title. Ke is therefore in 
equity regarded as the owner of the property. 
(Footnote omitted.) 
618 P.2d at p. 59. See also, In Re Booth, 19 B.R. 53 (U.S. 
Bankr. Ct. D. Utah 1982); and Utah State Med. Ass!n. v. Utah 
State Emp. Credit Un., 655 P.2d 643 (Utah 1982). 
Vendor!s Inability to Convey Good Title 
It has been held in a number of cases that commencement 
of an eminent domain proceeding against land subject to an 
executory contract for sale that is silent regarding condemnation 
entitles the vendee to rescind the contract and sue for the 
return of any purchase money paid by him before the condemnation 
action was instituted. The theory is that the vendor covenants 
to convey good title at a future date, unencumbered and free from 
defect, and that the eminent domain proceeding creates an 
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encumbrance upon the title. Rights and Liabilities of Parties to 
Executory Contract for Sale of Land Taken by Eminent Domain, 27 
A.L.R.3d 57 2, § 13(a), pp. 606-608. See also, Hunt v, Inner 
Harbor Land Co. , 61 Cal. App. 271, 214 p. 998 (Cal. 1923); Ogren 
v. Inner Harbor Land Co., 83 Cal. App, 197, 256 P. 607 (Cal. 
1927); Kares v. Covell, 180 Mass. 206, 62 N.E. 244 (Mass. 1902); 
Gillis y. Bonelli-Adams Co., 284 Mass. 176, 187 N.E. 535 (Mass, 
1933); Miller v. Calvin, 44 Wash. 226, 87 P. 264 (Wash, 1906); 
and Von Waldheim v. Enqlewood Heights Estates, 115 N.J.L. 2 20, 
179 A- 19 (N.J. 1935). 
In Von Waldheim, supra, the vendor received the entire 
condemnation award. In affirming the trial court's award to the 
purchasers of the payments they had made under the contract, the 
New Jersey Court of Appeals wrote: 
It would be an unconscionable 
thing, since the seller could not perform, to 
permit retention of the consideration that 
had been paid. 
179 A. at 21. 
This Case 
The December 19, 1980 real estate contract between 
Malnar and Elder for the sale and purchase of the seventy-six 
acres was silent regarding the right to any proceeds from any 
eminent domain proceedings. (Brief of Appellant, Addendum 3) 
Elder was in possession of the land and not in default under the 
real estate contract in September 1982 when Deseret commenced 
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eminent domain proceedings and served summons with respect to a 
right-of-way over 5.21 of the 76 acres. Elder was in possession 
and not in default on October 18, 1982, when an order of 
immediate occupancy was entered and the required cash deposit for 
the taking of the right-of-way was paid into the court by Deseret 
for the landowner. Judge Davidson determined the date of the 
taking to be October 18, 1982. (Addendum "F") Elder was in 
lawful possession and not in default for an additional fourteen 
(14) months while the eminent domain proceedings continued. 
On page 16 of the Brief of Appellant, Malnar 
acknowledges that "the presence of a high-tension wire which 
rendered the property unsuitable for residential purposes" was 
one reason "why the plaintiffs gave up the property." Malnar 
tacitly acknowledges that Bellon!s predecessors were injured by 
the taking. Nevertheless, without citing any case law to support 
her position Malnar argues that she is entitled to the proceeds 
awarded in the eminent domain action for that injury. 
Malnar's arguments fly in the face of well-settled law 
that the contract owner of real property, in lawful possession of 
that property on the date summons is served in eminent domain 
proceedings, is entitled to compensation for the taking. 
Malnar!s greed is further illustrated in wanting to retain all 
purchase money paid by BelIon!s predecessors as well as the 
entire eminent domain award. Had Bellon!s predecessors sued for 
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rescission and the return of the purchase money paid, Bellon 
would have been entitled to: 
Principal $50,130,46 
Interest 26,059.90 
Total Purchase Money Paid $76,190.36 
This amount would have exceeded the equitable restitution of 
$71,183.14 the trial court ordered. It would be an 
unconscionable thing since Malnar could not convey good title at 
a future date to permit retention of the purchase money paid and 
the eminent domain proceeds. Bellon is entitled to credit for 
the eminent domain award. The trial court justly accounted for 
Malnar!s receipt of the $35,075. 
Malnar1s claim to the eminent domain award is based 
upon the fact that she received the $35,075 in March 1985. She 
is understandably careful in her Brief of Appellant to avoid 
discussion of when the right to the award vested. 
To the extent that her security under the December 18, 
1980 real estate contract was impaired, Malnar had a lien upon 
the eminent domain award. However, the $35,075 award Malnar 
eventually received had the effect of reducing the February 3, 
1984 contract balance of $101,919.35 to $66,844.35. A second 
alternative method of calculating Malnar!s actual damages might 
have been as follows: 
Balance owing on contract 
as of February 3, 1984 $101,919.35 
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Less: Eminent domain 
award received 
in 1985 and 1986 ( 35,075.00} 
Additional interest owing 
to date of forfeiture 10,191.95 
Taxes and assessments paid 1,774.52 
TOTAL DUE MALNAR $ 78,810.92 
Land received back $150,000.00 
Less: Total Due Malnar 78,810.92 
Equitable Restitution Due 
Bellon $ 71,189.18 
Under the real estate contract, Elder was entitled to 
the emiment domain award. Malnar argues and seeks a declaration 
that the award was forfeited. The March 7, 1985 stipulation in 
the eminent domain action provided: 
3. Defendants Eider, Jenkins , McCarver, 
Mabey and Johnson agree t he i r i n t e r e s t in the 
above-described property i s l imited to tha t 
of a c l a i m a g a i n s t Marvel Malnar for 
e q u i t a b l e r e s t i t u t i o n of monies f o r f e l t e d 
under t h e r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t between 
t h e m s e l v e s and d e f e n d a n t Malnar d a t e d 
December 19, 1980, for the sa le of the above-
described proper ty . (Emphasis added.) 
B e l l o n 1 s c la im to c r e d i t for the eminent domain award Malnar 
claims was fo r fe i t ed under the r ea l e s t a t e contract i s c l ea r l y 
cons i s ten t with tha t s t i p u l a t i o n . 
The t r i a l c o u r t c o r r e c t l y c o n s i d e r e d the unique 
c i r cums tances and e q u i t i e s in t h i s case in determining tha t 
Bel lon was e n t i t l e d to a c red i t for the eminent domain award 
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Malnar received. The trial court's award of equitable 
restitution should be affirmed, 
B. Under Utah Law Bellon is Entitled to Equitable Restitution in 
the Amount of $71,163,14, 
In determining whether enforcement of a liquidated 
damages provision would result in an arbitrary penalty which 
would be grossly disproportionate to a seller's actual damages, 
this Court has recognized that "the goal in awarding sellers 
damages for loss of use of the property is to grant a reasonable 
return on investment.11 Warner v. Rasmussen, 704 P.2d 559 (Utah 
1985). However, in Allen v, Kinqdon, 723 P. 2d 394 (Utah 1936), 
Justice Zimmerman was careful to point out: 
In fact, I believe this Court 
routinely applies the alternative test of 
Warner—that the liquidated damages must bear 
some reasonable relationship to the actual 
damages—and that we carefully scrutinize 
liquidated damage awards. 
72 3 P.2d at 398. See also: Modern Statutes of Defaulting 
Vendee's Right to Recover Contractual Payments Withheld by Vendor 
as Forfeited, 4 A.L.R. 4th 993, where it is generally recognized 
that a threshold is reached where the purchaser's payments total 
10 percent or more of the purchase price, When that threshold is 
met, the courts scrutinize most critically the proportionality 
between the amount sought to be forfeited and the actual damages. 
In determining a "reasonable return11 and a "reasonable 
relationship" the Court has compared the amount sought as 
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liquidated damages to the contract price and to the seller's 
actual damages. The Court has also considered the period the 
purchaser has been in possession. The table set forth in 
Addendum lfL!f demonstrates the range of percentages held to be 
either disproportionate or reasonable. The percentage ratio of 
liquidated damages to actual damages is telling. This case falls 
squarely within the range of percentages where liquidated damages 
have been held to be disproportionate to actual damages. 
Malnar has received seventy-three percent (73%) of the 
purchase price as purchase money and eminent domain award. That 
amount ($111,265.36) is 273% of her actual damages ($40,082.22). 
The annual return she seeks by way of enforcing the liquidated 
damages provision is twenty-three percent (23%), more than twice 
the contract rate of ten percent (10%). When compared to the 
percentages in the cases where disproportionality was held to 
exist, the three percentages in this case together are more 
shocking than any single percentage in any one of those cases. 
It cannot be disputed that Bellon has met the burden of 
showing that the liquidated damages clause was invalid. Vines v. 
Orchard Hills, Inc., 435 A. 2d 1022 (Conn, i960) Nor can it be 
disputed that Bellon is entitled to equitable restitution of the 
amount Malnar received in excess of her actual damages, 
$71,183.14 ($111,265.36 - 40,082.22 = $71,183.14) This Court 
should affirm the award to Bellon of this amount. 
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CONCLUSION 
Malnar has failed to demonstrate evidence which clearly 
preponderates against any of the trial court's findings she 
appeals. No evidence clearly preponderates against the finding 
that Malnar paid $1,774.52 in taxes and water assessments for 
Elder. Malnar1s stipulation that Bellon be substituted as 
plaintiff precludes her from challenging the trial court's 
finding that BelIon's predecessors assigned to Bellon "ail of 
their right, title and interest in and to the real estate 
contract with Malnar and the seventy-six (76) acres described 
therein." No evidence clearly preponderates against the findings 
that the earnest money was entered into on December 18, 1980 and 
led up to the final contract. 
No evidence preponderates against the trial court's 
findings that Bellon was entitled to the six (6) acres, that 
Malnar1s actual damages totalled only $40,082.22 or that Malnar 
received $111,265.36 as purchase money and eminent domain 
proceeds. It is clear under Utah law that the $111,265.36 Malnar 
received was grossly excessive and disproportionate to her actual 
damages of $40,082.22 and that Bellon is entitled to equitable 
restitution of $71,183.14. 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and 
Judgment and Decree entered by the trial court should be 
affirmed. 
46 
CROSS APPEAL 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BELLON IS ENTITLED TO PRE-JUDGMENT 
INTEREST. 
Where the amount due in a contract action is 
ascertainable by calculation and only the method to be used in 
making the calculation is uncertain, then awarding pre-judgment 
interest is proper. Jack B, Parson Const. Company v. State, 552 
P.2d 107 (Utah 1976). There, a highway contractor sought to 
recover a sum it claimed due on a construction contract entered 
into with the State of Utah. This Court held that awarding pre-
judgment interest was proper and "in conformity with the prior 
decisions of this court" [Fell v. Union Pacific R. Co., 32 Utah 
101, 88 P. 1003; Uinta Pipeline Corp. v. White Superior Co., 546 
P.2d 885 (Utah 1976).] 
In Fell, supra, this Court wrote: 
The true test to be applied as t o 
whether interest should be allowed before 
judgment in a given case or not is, 
therefore, not whether the damages are 
unliquidated or otherwise, but whether the 
injury and consequent damages are complete 
and must be ascertained as of a particular 
time and in accordance with fixed rules of 
evidence and known standards of value, which 
the court or jury must follow in fixing the 
amount, rather than be guided by their best 
judgment in assessing the amount to be 
allowed for past as well as for future 
injury, or for elements that cannot be 
measured by any fixed standards of value. 
47 
The same rule under the same conditions would 
of necessity apply to actions for breach of 
contract. 
88 P. at 1007. This rule continues today. 
This Court has explained its reasons for awarding 
interest by way of damages: 
Interest by way of damages, or moratory 
interest, as it is sometimes called, is 
interest allowed in actions for breach of 
contract or in actions for tort as damages, 
for the unlawful detention of money found to 
be due. It depends not upon any express 
contractual obligation to pay interest, but 
upon the theory that the party breaching the 
contract or committing the tort became bound 
at the time of the breach to make reparation; 
and for this delay in making such reparation, 
the injured party is entitled to such 
interest, as will recompense him therefor. 
Farnworth v. Jensen, 217 P.2d 571, 575 (Utah 1950). 
In Farnworth, respondents admitted the retention and 
use of appellant's money under a real estate contract. 
Respondents sought to avoid paying interest, because appellant 
was dilatory in clearing title. The Utah Supreme Court rejected 
respondents1 arguments and awarded appellants interest at the 
legal rate "from the time the money became due to appellant until 
the principal and interest were merged into .judgment. ff 217 P. 2d 
571, 576. [Emphasis in original.] 
The Case at Bar 
Since February 3, 1984, Malnar has unjustly retained 
$71,183.14 of money belonging to Bellon or their predecessors. 
They have been deprived of the use of that money. Malnar has had 
the use of that money. 
The amount to which Bellon is entitled has been 
ascertainable, although the method of calculation has been 
disputed. The amount was complete on February 3, 1984 and 
determinable by fixed rules of evidence and known standards of 
value. 
Bellon should be awarded interest at the legal rate on 
the money Malnar has retained from: 
February 3, 1984: 
Principal paid $50,130.46 
Interest paid 26,059.90 
Less: Malnar!s 
Actual Damages ( 40,082.22) 
$36,108.14 
March 30, 1985 9,075.00 
December 30, 1986: $32,000.00 
Less: Malnar 
Attorney's fees ( 6,000.00) 
24,000.00 
$71,183.14 
The law on the subject is well-settled in Utah and under the 
facts of this case Bellon1s right to pre-judgment interest cannot 
be disputed. 
# 
Respectfully submitted this [ 0 day of July, 1989 
s _ 
ROBERT F. 0RT0> ^ 
VIRGINIA C. LEE 
MARSDEN, 0RT0N & CAH00N 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies by her signature that 
on this / P d a v of L JLLJL? J , 1989, she mailed four 
/ I 
true and correct copies of /the foregoing Brief and Cross Appeal 
of Respondent to: 
Gordon A. Madsen, Esq. 
Robert C. Cummings, Esq. 
Attorneys for Defendant Malnar 
225 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ADDENDUM 
July 23, 1980 Earnest Money Agreement (Plaintifffs Trial 
Exhibit 3, Admitted Tr. 32) 
December 18, 1980 Earnest Money Agreement (Plaintiff's Trial 
Exhibit 4, Admitted Tr. 35) 
December 19, 1980 Escrow Agreement (Plaintiff's Trial 
Exhibit 27, Admitted Tr. 78, and Tr. 78-79) 
December 19, 1980 Warranty Deed from Malnar to Elder 
covering the six (6) Acres (Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 11, 
Admitted Tr. 37) 
Assignment of Claims and Cause uf Action (Plaintiff's Trial 
Exhibit 19, Admitted Tr. 40); Motion, Stipulation and Order 
re: Substitution (R. 026-032, 033-034, 041-042) 
August 19, 1985 Ruling in Eminent Domain Action (Plaintiff's 
Trial Exhibit 35, Admitted Tr, 145) 
Sections 78-34-9 and 11, U.C.A. 
Rule 19(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
December 19, 1980 Quit Claim Deed (Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 
10, admitted Tr. 42) 
Malnar!s Testimony that Bellon's predecessors did not delay 
her in repossessing the property and that she never made any 
attempt to sell it"(Tr. 287-289) 
Trial court's comments on Malnar !s failure to plead 
counterclaim or affirmative defense of quiet title or 
slander of title (Tr. 22-23) 
Utah cases regarding disproportionality or reasonableness of 
forfeit ed payments 
I r r t - =ttb 
i tuuu >ee* uuie bJVice 
o-££*troR3C2T . 
N C O N M O C O A T I O N OF your agreement 
it ea'iiett monty thfl 
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i'ii« of Broker Company ^ — "» 
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Including »°y 0< Ihe following items II at pretent attached to ins premltet: Plumbing and hasting fixturet and equleoieot Including ttoker and oil tanks, water heetert. and burners, electric 
light fixtures excluding bulbs, bathroom fixtures, roller thedet, curtain rodi and fixtures, Venetian blinds, window and door t o e e m , linoleum, all ihrub* and treet. and any other fixtures 
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_ _ _ _ „ _ _ _ _ on delivery ol deed 0' 'In 
M«e ItaMiita of t . . _. _ loqether with Intarett It paid; orovlded 
28 paymault upon the unpaid balance, subject to the limitation* ol any mortgage or contract by the buyer herein attumad. Interetl a 
2*) pu'cnate prtre to he included lo toe preunbed o.»ytienlt .1 
30 ol piotierty, and expentet (iMnMiiance tnall lie born hv tl , 
Jt p«iM4ied at <il date ol potsettlon. All olhei t.i«e> jnd .ill .isve\tinenlv moi lgauy. 
Pttlon which thall be on or be<o«e / * ) > y z y I * IO« ai lddettr i i t ' lnn 
n whlrh lima property i m i , reol i , li<tu>anc«t, iriiocatl and other M u r ' U t i of the orot'^'ly than t,« 
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:h«io«t attal"<l the pt»p«>lv 
ideit h^thlt tale: Sewer (Q>- C o n n e c t e u ^ . Septic T ank and/or Ce"Pool ^ . S i d e w a l k g j l Ctirh and r.ultei Q . Special Sue, 
34 Q . «.per,.,l Street Llqh.l.M, (£ | . Culinary w . . l « (Cl.v ^ . f>lh« Ci.mmun.ly r.ytlm,, £ | . Connnc^d ( d . l M - M i f ^ l tl e.,e..d: vet ( . , No (ol . 
J
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• (•Mined *S iMIiiifl.ll* (I and .iqi.-ctl d.lmaqn. 
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to the undertigned agxnt. 
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41 " i t iitwt.-t stood .mo .nj.e.U th.lt I h f l f i m t v.Mttrn in lint .eicipt rortttilula Ihe cnllie f r - l l i .IM.MV Omtiacl he I «**«?•! the
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~-£L 
4S VV.> rl'» herehv i>qtf lo CArty mil and fulfill Ihe lei 
40 Motion ,1 noli, v ol title niMirjuce in tlic n.oor ol the 
4 7 in Hie event of t.ilr of oilier lo.in ip.il i i iopi'tiy, tel 
48 UK-lit. •» ••• any rirjhl .uitiiiq out ol !»«• tve.y- li then 
49 •'»•* trili?i .imect ••< coiiMdrration ol Ihe e»li 
50 !•» IhC event teltei h.it cnlrrvd Inlo a 11 
II rii'iv.'le eviileoi 
cloiliii'i .• T . m . . . 
the .ini-ul in pi.. 
_ 4j.t~e <? #>f-jr„ 
„
 te, ,a If either paity lallt . . ^ , - ,to. -e ,o. 
«airt aneol 4 rn.nm.Klon of _ _ 2 _ . S r 
f l ler l lve. thlt t.MaqttO* will tie of no <m 
_X -77^ ***%£ L. jhiaJ&tA^' 
'^&C&^J^£k£L*--
(sVtry offtct is tndcf>tnd(ntly oiJitcd and optraUd 
5J (SUlc i.<v» «ettu«i«t b«oke«« to fumtth copies of thit cuntrjct bearing .ill tignattoet to bnye' and teller. Oeoendani upon the method uted, one of the following lormt must be completed.) 
R E C E I P T 
5* I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of Mi* loieqolno agieemeni bearing an iignaturev 
i pcMonjiiy d o t e d .i Miu» copy of l h * Io>e9olou jy iefmei i i o<.'jini9 J " Jiyi'oiuict lo be nMited lo the Q Setter, ^ J Pyichater, on 
19 , by legittered man and return receipt U attached hereto. 
.9^2 ., 
\\TV£ TIE rincucomiooD recrLSstcr-^Ls; 
l$bti\.}y^ (\cnti\/ Roosevelt u»h. Dec.. 1 ft 10 80 
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«
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 Co«p»ny Ferron Elder 
DERATION OP your agreement to'use your effort* to present this offer to the Seller. l / w e _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
v L 1 it 100.00 . One I!undredmuj nn /mn _ _. 
» you 11 t irnt i i money the turn of (S „, . . __ .__: ) ' . . 
Cash deposi ted with Labrum Realty 23 Ju ly 1980 
1 to «eure i*d apply on .he_purch.se of .he property .<«u.««J it: 76 a c r e s SCC 34 T 2 s . RnflRe ^ IW^U . S . M . 
6 
7 
8 
io ^ Duchesne - ^
 Sltte o,_ Utah 
Sec 
100 
tn 1 
34 
f t 
NW quar t e r 
T2s Range 
. West 550, 
of the 
IW U.S. 
, North 
NW 
.M. 
230 
quart 
Runn 
f t . 
:er. 
ting 
to | 
Less 4 
East 
point 
AC M/L. Beg. 
690 f t . South 330 
of beginning . 
630ft 
f t . 
from 
West 
i NW 
140 
corner of 
f t . North 
11 including any of the following itemi it at present attached to the premtaea: Plumbing and healing fitturei and equipment including tinker and oil tank*, water heater*, and burner*. 
c Tight fixture! excluding bulbs, 
None 
12 electric t re* i bathroom fixture*, roller shades, curtain rod* and fixture*. Venetian blind*, window and dour screens, linoleum, all ihrub* and tree*, and any 
other fixture* except 
14 The following per*onal property shall alio be included at part of the property pi.rcha.ed: 1 2 S h a r e s , D r y G u l c h W a t e r 
it ; 
i« , 
.7 The tot., purch^ e price of (t 152 ,000 .00 , One Hundred F i f ty Two Thousand and no/100 DOLLARS 
18 ihall be payable »* follow*: $ XUU . UU which represent* the aforedeicrlbed deposit, receipt of which U hereby acknowledged by you: 
19 » wh»n teller approve* tale; $_ 
23.400.00 
"« delivery of deed or final contract of 
20 tale which shall be on or before P e g . 2 4 I 9 _ 8 C L . and J each month commencing.. 
21 Seller to carry halanrp nvpr a fMvp ypar pprlnd with 5 annual payments, first 
annual payment 1 year from c l o s i n g . I n t e r e s t on the balance w i l l be 10%. S e l l e r 
2j to r e l e a s e 6 ac res a t c l o s ing and w i l l r e l e a s e 10 acre p a r c e l s upon payment of 
24 3.000.00 per ac re a l l r e l e a s e s must be approved by Bow Valley of Denver Colorado. 
25 Released parce l w i l l s t a r t on the nor the rn boundary l i n e and move in a sou the r ly 
2« d i r e c t i o n . 
27 until the balance of t 1 _ Q % D U U . U U together with interest ia paid; provided, however, that buyer at hi* option, at anv time, may pay amount* in excesi of the monthly 
2a payi.^nti upon the unpaid balance, subject to the limitation* of any mortgage or contract by the buyer herein u iumed. !ntere*t » t _ r _ _ _ _ % per annum on the unpaid portions of the 
29 purchase price to be included in the prescribed payment* and (hall begin a* of date of po_«»*ion which *hall br on or l x f o r e _ _ _ _ b l ? _ I i _ - l 9 All ri*k of low and destruction 
10 of property, and expense* of inmrance (hall be born by the seller until date of postossion at which time property taxes, rent*, inturance, interest and other eipente* of the property (hall 
) l be prorated ai of date of poiKiiiun. All other taic* and all assessments, morUanea, chattel lien* and .other liens, encumbrance* or charge* again*! the property of any nature (hall j2 be paid by ,he .eiier except: Any easement of record or apgarant easements,. 
J J The following (pccial improvements are included in tftia tale: Sewer Q—Connected Q . Septic Tank and/or Cesspool Q . Sidewalk _ ] • Curb and Gutter Q Special Street 
)4 Paving Q Special Street Lighting Q . Culinary Water (City Q . Other Community System Q. Private Q (Lcitend: Yea (x) No (0). 
Jt CONTRACT OF SALE OR INSTRUMENT OF CONVEYANCE TO BE MADE ON THE APPROVED FORM OP THE UTAH SECURITIES COMMISSION IN THE NAME OP 
J6 Ferron Elder and as he d i r e c t s 
2 
J7 Thii payment is received and offer ia made lubject to the written acceptance of the teller endoried hereon within day* from date hereof, and unleaa *o 
18 approved the teturn of the money herein receipted (hall cancel thii offer without damage to the undesigned agent. 
19 In the event the purchaser faila to pay the balance of laid purchaie price or complete laid purchate aa herein provided, the amounti paid hereon thi l l , at the option of the 
40 seller be retained a* liquidated and agreed damage*. 
41 It ia undcratood and agreed that the term* written in than receipt conttitute the entire Preliminary Contract between the purchaser and the seller, and that no verbal statement 
42 made by anyone relative to this transaction (hall he construed to be a part of (his transaction unlea* incorporated in writing herein. It i* further agreed that execution of the final 
43 contract (hajluhcpgate thi* Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Ptirchaae. . . . _ _ „ „ 
u ^ ^ T - h ™ " A.,.,
 By flSBfe D e e E l d e r 
^ Broker Company 
41 We do hereby agree to carry out and fulfill the term* and condition* specified above, and the (ellei agrcea to furnish good and marketable title with abstract brought to date or at 
.* c . . . . . . . . . . L ,
 L L . , ,• • L . i none o ther 
46 Seller a option a policy of title insurance in the name of the purchaser and to make final conveyance by warranty deed or . : 
'" In the event of »ale of other than real property, seller will provide evidence of title or right to (ell or lease. If either party fail* to to do. he agreet to pay all expemei of enforcing. 
of the I 
48 thia agr ement, or of any righ  rising out of he breach thereof, including a reasonable attorney* fee. n <jr\ \ r\(\ 
49 The seller agree* in consideration of the efforts of the agent in procuring a purchaser, to pay aaid agent a commiaaion of —
 f ZUU . UU efe 0f the (ale price. 
10 In the event seller ha* entered into a listing contract with any other agent and (aid contract ia presently effective, thi* paragraph will be of no force or effect. 
Signature of both Buyer & S e l l e r voids any previous c o n t r a c t s signed on the 
above p r o p e r t y . 
Agent Steve Malnar i s hand ca r ry ing t h i s document as a favor to the s e l l e r 
in *o*i way i s Steve Malnar ac t i ng as a Agent on said s e l l he i s _on of s e l l e r . 
Ferron Elder i s a l i cenced Real Es t a t e Agent in the S t a t e of Utah and i s buying 
proper ty for p r o f i t or ga in . 
51 (State law requires brokers t f^W_ka_^ | j^^^^__M contract bearing all signatures to buyer and seller. Dependent upon the method used, one of the following forme must be completed.) 
R E C E I P T 
M 1 acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing agreement bearing all signaturec y^^) / J s i 
Date 
1<S I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing agreement bearing all signatures to be mailed to the d Seller. • Purcha* 
57 IQ i by registered mail and return receipt ii attached hereto. 
Blank N o . 12J Long—Gem Printing Co. 
U n o f i P V P l h f fTI-ah B4f)fifi 
(Address! 
i The under.imed. MARVET, MAT.NAR, a k a M a r v e l L. M a l n a r 
reinafier called Grantor and 
retmfter calhd Grantee herewith deliver to voti In c«tro» the locunicnl* and proocrlj hcrein-xllcr dc»cr1bcd to bo held and disposed ol by jou In accordance 
Hh the Inatrui tlona ml upon the term* hen in ml forth mil not otherwise to all of which the undersigned hereby arrce Said documents and property are 
•irtbtd a« follow. (Ainch -whin lorn I »hccta if rcnuircd) 
Warranty Deed"' > 
Quit Claim Deed* . 
The Original of the Contract-' 
Notice of I n t e r e s t in Real Es ta te C o n t r a c t / (copy) 
Policy of Title Insurance*/ 
tf 
1 \m air herel.v lutimrm I iml tint ti-tl to It li\ r th. »t vi I.« HU I l..< unit ul» iml prom rlj to f.ruiitt tn»on pit nit tit In vou it tin i Idn 
-titled for the t.rintt.r ol tin tot •! MIIU of $ j j . 1 ,f„ Q L ^ * Q Q i»r...,.|,,l iml Inn n -I on Hit unpild Imlnntt Ihcreof til _ L 2 J L 
r cent, per annum from D e c e m b e r 1 6 / 1 9 8 0
 {(i ^ | ( ( M f f t | | o w t , S n w l f > , , a l e aI ) l, a n i o u n l o ( M t n „ J > n a „ i «l 
incipai and datca of Intern! pajment ) 
$23,500.00 Down. The remaining balance of $128,500.00 be paid 
in two equal yearly ins t a l lmen t s of $26,395.18 each, which includes 
accrued i n t e r e s t to due d a t e . Three equal year ly payments of $40 ,234 .16^ , 
each which includes p r i nc ipa l and i n t e r e s t to due da te , such payments ^£-? 
of l a rge r amount being due in December 16, 1983« 19C4, 1985. ~ -
2tll payments s h a l l be applied f i r s t to the earned i n t e r e s t . T ^ ' ? ? ? 
3 Upon the hnppeninr however of inr one or more of the followlnr evtnls 
" ~ a l In the event thit am pajment of principal or in ten si above pnciifled be not made on or before tho date above •pccifled for the payment thereof and 
m* within 3 D day? thireifttr time oclnr the emence of thl* contract 
b> In the event the Grintt* I nt* t i pi \ ill i i \ m iml || n«. anient , i f wi> kind Includlnr Ihose for water rights levied or atsctsed for any purpose on 
the above described property for in> of thi veim a f t e r t h l S d a t e before the <intc become delinquent 
el In the event Grintit filU to kiop the impnncnnnt* now or hereafter situated on (he above property at all times Insured acainat loss by fire in 
an amount not Itss Hun $ lom if inv paviblt to _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ by insurance policies held in >our possession or In the 
po*sct?ion of the mortriree If nm of the *-iid prtiucrtt in c\idcnced by written receipt ol said tnorttaceo deposited herewith in lieu of the policies 
d) . 
n In audi event or event* htninittcr nftrrtd to in .It f mliiC"Grantor may atrftlfe"option, maktf written demand upon you for the delivery to him of 
id document* and proptrtj siMtifjinr my on* or more of *mh ill fault* ns rround for sitth dtlnHtuI upon receipt of which dim in I jou shall nt one* 
liver 10 the Grantee per* millv or it jour option du>o«it in Hit Unilid M tU a mail |>ONI IKC pripaid uklrtsaed to Grantee at 7 6 O E a S t 
U ? U N O r t n , B O U n t l f U l ,ur at suth utlur mldt-t** t« hi moj dirttl by a wriliur d i l l m e d tu jutC a copy of auch demand statins; the ditt 
wo* rctrlved b> jou If within d u x alter until ii»t»j of a lid dtmand la so uirsoiully »tr\id on Grantee or deposited in the United Stifcn 
dl addressed to Grande a* if immld^Urnii lu deliver* to )ou writtm notice (hat he objitts to jour i-ompljinK with the Grantor a said tit uiaml for -UH 
taon, jou shall at once delhir to tin' Gr tutor ptmottith or at jour option deposit In tho United Plaits mail, |>o««nifi* ptrpaltl nddrtsatd to the Uritutnr tit 
-xf 6, NeoliU-Jltah 84053. 
at such othtr vklrtm a* hi m >> dintt t j a writing dtlivtrcd to ydll a copy of the Grjiilit s •»ld uotln UM| withhold delivery of add papim iml dot. 
tents "Until such time as tin Grantor tiud Hit Granite Khill l intt jou In wrltlnc « h i ( diwooiiitioii to make H»<rvof in wliitli tveut the sunt m i> tx» d< ill 
th by >oU In ittord uut with miHt dlrtttioiia If no dtrtttion« art NO rctt-Utd b) jou jou may withhold dell«Tr> until jour dutiis and tht rlahta of Hie 
rtits with renuett then to h ive^unn Jtnlltially <k terntlitetl If l i u » m r within siid itnotl of da^s ufttr you have so personullj airwd or 
lOtfittd in the mall writttu uottit to Hit Grmlu of Hit Or ititor t di in mil an ibove proviltd sakl Grnulte airvts mi you IHI written obiectiou tu iltliviry of 
d douittuut* and prot>ertv to Onnl ir 11 luuunlid bj him Ul of »ii<l tlo<ttiu«nt» iml pruxrtv not Hun tit live rati b> jon under the Itruia Inn of in i) 
dtlivirvd tu Grantor in utordunt with hi A Kin iml lrrti>iKt tivt of tin ground apttificd Hurt lor ami of whtlhtr uuj croitml la spttifltd or ixiat* and jou 
til haw no lurthtr dittv II tl iluj or obliirilion thtrifor >r in toiiuttilou Hurt with irovidtd th it jou tint nt jour option it auj limit without 11 iMIitv 
an> out withholl dt lntrj of ill s ml tlotunitiils and proiMrtj ml K lint lo rtttlvt furthtr ptjmtnls In rt under until jour richta power*, and dutiis hire 
Itr in an) r«»pott rtquettid lij jou h u e U t n acltltd atttptablj tu jour«i|vta bj furtlnr wrilttu inairuttJou* of Hit limitrtntmd Jolnllj or flnallj titter 
ned by JittlUlal attioir brought bj jou or auj uliur part) 
uiu u i nur K M u i m i to mvp any ounce or «icuiunu, nor tcuutreu <<> taitc any action wnuiever except us herein expressly provtut t i : mill you slum nut be uauic 
• any floss or tfjutiage nut caused »»y your w i l l fu l misconduct. 
9. Grantor may at h i t option himself make payment of the amount specified In subparagraph 3 ( b ) abore or any of them, or provide I he insurance and pay 
i premium!; thereun provided for in subparagraph 3 ( c ) above, in which event or event i (he amounts so paid by Grantor shal l , upon presentation to you of 
<elpt« showintr such payments. tx> added lo the then unpaid pr incipal balance and shall d raw Interest as provided above w i t h respect to the unpaid principal balance. 
9. T h e u n d e r l i n e d fur ther a t r t c : 
a ) T h a t yuu shall not In-
r e v i v e d hereunder or in 
whatever under this a f reet 
b ) T h a i you act hcrcumler as 
i- lor any error or mistake 
ut ioinr whether irmnu.l the 
or In connection herewi th 
depository only, ami an* 
In I act or In law In del iver ing or paying over Haul documents cr pro|>erty or nny funds 
refor exists or I he r ights of the rest»ecilve parties U ie rHo . nur (or any other art or omission 
it done in good fit i t t i . cxeppiiuif only your own wi l l fu l niisisinduct: 
not responsible or l iable in any maimer whatever Itir :•»•>• act lo l>c performed hereunder 
any fai luri* to pcrfom by cither, or for the suff iciency, correctness, genuineness or val idity 
respect to the form or execution of the same, or I hi- Identi ty, author i ty or r igh t * of any 
c<iucst. waiver , consent, receipt or other paper or document believed by you to be 
of any a u n t , at torney or employee appoimi-d by yuu If such a t cut, attorney or 
or yuvir duties thereunder, and you shall 
on the part of cither the Grantor or (he Urai 
of any Instrument deposited wi th you hereunder, or 
person executing- or depositing the same, 
e l T h a i except an herein otherwise expressly provided, you shall be under no obl igat ion whatever to r i v e any nolivc concerning any payment or 
any default hereunder, or any oil ier n o t i i v : 
d l T h a t you t h a i ! out ho l iable In acting upon any notk 
tenuine and to be HI if tied by the proper party or part ies: 
e ) T h a i you Mhall not Is- answerabb' for the delaul t or misconduct 
employee shall have lucti selected wi th reason able t a n - : 
I I T h a t you may advis.- w i t h legal counsel wi th respect to the construction of I he foregoing Innlrnclic 
not be l iable in any respect (or fo l towinr such advice: 
t> The undersigned jo in ly and severally agree to pay all costs, expenses a n d / o r attorney's fees you may Incur hciruudor, for all of which, together 
w i l h your own compensation, you shall have, and are hereby granted, a first lien on the documents and proper ly above described, and all (viud» coming 
into your hands hereunder, and you shall In* uiitier no obl igat ion to deliver any ol said documents, proper ly , or I U I H I M unt i l such lien li;oi been paid 
and dischnrrcd, anyth ing herein contained to the eontrary notwi thstanding. 
h i T h a t , any th ine herein contained to the contrary notwi thstanding, you are hereby expressly authorised and directed lo disregard, in your sole »!••• 
ere I ion. any and all no I i n - , and warning.-' tha i may l>e civen dy any of the parl ies hereto, or by anyone else, cxccpl iui ; those for which express pro-
vision Is herein made, and yuu are hereby expressly author ized in comply wi th and obey any and all orders. Judgments and decrees o l any euurt, made, 
f i led, entered or issued, whether wi th or wi thout jur isd ic t ion: and in cane you shall obey, or comply w i th any such order, judgment, or decree, you shall 
nul be l iable to any o l the parties hereto, or to anyone else or otherwise by reason of any such compliance, notwi thstanding the l a d tha i uny such 
order, iudgnicnt, or decree may be subsequently reversed, modif ied, annulled, sei aside or vacated. 
?. T l w undersirnetl jo iu i ly 
$100.po 
and severally airrcc to pay you as cnmncnftalioti for your services hereun«'«-r 
S p l i t between Buyer and S e l l e r . 
In i t ia l lee of $ 1Q0.QQ. an annual fee of 
able annual ly in advancv for each addit ional year or fract ion thereof after the. f i rsl year that any money, document or proper ly shall bo held by you hcrr-
ler, and an addit ional fee of l / 1 0 l h of t % (but not less than on each collection) of al l funds rccciTctl by you hereunder, to«ether w i lh 
actual and necessary expenses and l iabil i t ies you may incur hereunder, (or all of wh ich you arc granted a first lien on all of the above described properly and 
umeuls and al l funds cuniim; into your hands hereunder, and yuu shall bo under no obl igat ion (o deliver any of said documcols. property or funds unt i l such lien 
discharged, anythintr herein conta ins ! to the eontrary notwi thstanding. You reserve (he option of Increasing the annual fee af ter one year f rom the dale 
eof for servlres rendered herein, and upon not (ess (han th i r ty (JO) days wr i t ten notice (o both the undersigned. 
S. A l l funds collet-ted nit this escrow are to be distr ibuted as fo l lows: 
F i r s t : To the payment of all escrow fees, charges, and expenses of the escrow air en I Incident to thin account. 
Second: Remi t to M f l H / p l M a l n a r , a k a M a r V P I T , . M f l l n a r at the f o l l o w l n r address _ 
Rnx ft, N e n l a , Utah 84053 
T h i r d : flalance tn be r e m i t t r d 
• Credit checking account uti 
[> G r a n t o r : 
nber _ 
D By cheek to the follow-in* address . 
• Credit savings account n u m b e r _ 
9. T h a t no change or modi f icat ion of this ar r» f tncut . nor of any rlsrtil. t i t le. Interest or l lab i l l iv hereunder, shall be binding on you, w i thout vour wr i t ten 
ist'itt, nor -hu l l any assivument or translcr of any r ight , t i t le or interesl o l the undersigned, or any of them, hereunder. U- binding on you wi thout wr i t ten 
iev lo you antt your acknowledgement thereol , b u i , -ubjet | to said l i m i t a t i o n . , this aKriTincnl shall lie biu.llng on and in favor of the heirs, devises, lerales. 
t u t o r s , administrators, suifcssors n o d / o r a * * l r u * of the resiK-etlve , par l 'es hereto, w i th l ike el fecl an lo the parl ies. 
10. No demand or notice f rom the underslrned or any of them lo you shall be considered as delivered lo. served upon or received by you unless and unt i l 
is delivered in w r i l l n r to one of your of f icer* personally at the office abov* specified, or is received ai said off ice by United States registered m a i l . 
11. T h e words Grantor" and ••GraiHee" and the lamruaue of this instrument , where there U more than one Grantor and Grnnlcc, shall be construed as 
i/ul and In- binding euu.illy on al l Mich Grantors a n d / o r Crantees, and In aM-s where one or more are (email's, the masculine shall include the feminine. T h e 
rd "undcrs i rned" us hereiubelun* used, refers to the Grantors and Grantees, and not lo vou. f\ 
12. Y o u h:v<c no responsibilities w i th restwet to renewing- any insurance policy or policies herein referred lo. or for the payment of any premiums on any such 
I Icy or policies. 
^ W I T N E S S W H E R E O F , the parl ies have executed this instrument , in t r ip l icate , a t . 
Ferrori~ C. EldeT £U •cr 
Rooseve l t ^ Utah this day »t DQC . IOJLP 
TIarvel Malnar 
aka Marvel L. Malnar 
GKA.NTKE3 (UUYEHSI 
I 
GflANTOKS (SELLERS) 
Social Security No. SZ?'32-03?d. 
ATE op
 Utah 
UNTY op^yehesne- J 
on .he 19 day of P e c . ,
 l980 ^rnoit,iiy up,H,m« before ..... Marvel Malnar and Ferron E l d e r 
aka Marvel L T M a l n a r 
t • i c n e r J S o f the above instrument who duly acknowledged to me t h a i . t . h e _ Y executed the same. 
*£ 0M,l^ 
• Commission Expires: 
4 /12 /84 
NOTARY PUBLIC, residinf at 
Neola , Utah 84053 7 
T h e undcrsirned hank hereby ackuowledirrs receipt of the dociiin 
ttie same In aecordan<-e wi th the instruct inn* and upon the terms 
Dated at R O O S e V e l t . this 
Utah 
* and tno|MTt) d c s i i i l s d in the (orctroinc agreement, and agrees to hold and dispose 
ml condit ions ilK»ve MM l o r l l u 
day of &*3/s*s{ A& f 
FIRST SRPfTRlTY Bank of Utah , N.A. 
R o o s e v e l t O f f i c e 
Recorded at Request of— 
at M. Fee Paid $_ 
by- Dep. Book-
Mail tax notice to- .Address-
Page- . Ref. 
WARRANTY DEED 
MARVEL MALNAR , a k a MARVEL L. MALNAR, 
of R o o s e v e l t , County of D u c h e s n e 
CONVEY and WARRANT to FERRON ELDER 
grantor 
, State of Utah, hereby 
oi Roosevelt, County of Duchesne, State of Utah 
TEN and NO/100 
grantee 
for the sum of 
— DOLLARS, 
the following described tract of land in D u c h e s n e County, 
State of Utah: 
TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH, R/ANGE 1 WEST, U.S.M. 
Section 34: West half of Northwest quarter 
LESS: 4 acres m/L Beginning 6 30 feet from the Northwest 
corner of Section 34, running East 690 feet 
South 330 feet West 140 feet North 100 feet West 
550 feet North 2 30 feet co the point of beginning. 
TOGETHER with 12 shares of Class D Dry Gulch Irrigation 
water. 
TOGETHER with all improvements and appurtenances 
thereunto belonging. 
EXCEPTING AND RESERVING all oil, gas and mineral rights. 
SUDJECT to all existing rights-of-way and easements bf 
record. 
WITNESS, the hand of said grantor , this 19th 
December • A* D: l9 E i9^y 
day of 
Signed in the Presence of 
STATE OE UTAH, 
County of D u c h e s n e 
On the 1 9 t h day of 
personally appeared before me 
D e c e m b e r , A. D. 19 80 
MARVEL MALNAR , aKa MARVEL L . MALNAR, 
the signer of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that she executed the 
same. 
x>tary Public. 
My commission expires "V// ? / ? c / 
-Residing in- ^ 
7° 
rtU«} Ufa£ fogs-3 
Recorded at Request of- _.. 
at M. Fee Paid $ 
by - Dep. Book Page . Ref.: 
Mail tax notice to Address 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
FERRON ELDER grantor 
°f R o o s e v e l t , County of D u c h e s n e State of Utah, hereby 
QUIT-CLAIM to 
MARVEL MALNAR , aka MARVEL L. MALNAR, 
grantee 
of R o o s e v e l t , County o f D u c h e s n e , S t a t e o f Utah for the sum of 
TEN and NO/100 DOLLARS, 
the following described tract of land in D u c h e s n e County, 
State of Utah: 
TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 1 WEST, U.S.M. 
Section 34: West half of Northwest quarter 
LESS: 4 acres m/1 Beginning 630 feet from the Northwest 
corner of Section 34, running East 690 feet 
South 330 feet West 140 feet North 100 feet West 
550 feet North 230 feet to the point of beginning. 
TOGETHER with 12 shares of Class D Dry Gulch Irrigation 
water. 
TOGETHER with all improvements and appurtenances 
thereunto belonqinq. 
EXECEPTING AND RESERVING all oil, gas and mineral rights, 
SUBJECT to all existing rights-of-way and easements of 
record. 
WITNESS rhe hand of said grantor , this 1 9 t h day of 
December , A. D. one thousand nine hundred and E i g h t y 
Signed in the presence of \ ~^&^ 
STATE Ol- UTAH, ] 
rss-
County oi Duchesne J 
On the 19 Lli day of December A. D. one 
thousand nine hundred and E i g h t y personally appeared before ine 
PERRON ELDER 
tiie signer of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledge to me that he executed the 
same. 
/ / Notary Public. 
.\!y commission expires 4*. ''•'.• y? Address: • ^ y - c V - / tCt*f> S-/05J 
U L A f m NO K ' J — • . « . M t | . , . ••• •.-'• : • .•< . • • i » - . l - u-t. i : 4*w i n * 
R E A L E S T A T E C O N T R A C T 
THIS CONTRACT made and entered into this /g_ daY o f 
December, 1980, by and between MARVEL MALNAR, who shall 
hereinafter be singularly or collectively referred to as Seller; 
and FERRON ELDER, who shall hereinafter be singularly or 
collectively referred to as Buyer: 
WITNESSETH: 
WHF.REAS, Seller is the owner and is in possession of certain 
property which property is hereinafter described and Seller is 
desirous of selling said property to Buyer upon the terms and 
conditions as set forth herein; and 
'WHEREAS, Buyer is desirous of purchasing said property 
according to the covenants and agreements herein contained. 
MOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises, 
covenants and agreements between the Buyer and Seller and the 
sums herein agreed to be paid, the parties hereto mutually agree 
as follows: 
1. PROPERTY: 
Pursuant to the terms hereinafter set forth, the Seller does 
hereby sell^and the Buyer does hereby buy the following described 
property^Deing situated in Duchesne County, State of Utah, to-
wit: 
TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 1 WEST, U.S.M. 
Section 34: West half of Northwest quarter 
LESS: 4 acres m/1 Beginning 6 30 feet from the Northwest 
corner f Section 34, running East 690 feet 
South 330 feet West 140 feet North 100 feet West 
550 feet North 230 feet to the point of beginning. 
TOGETHER with 12 shares of Class D Dry Gulch Irrigation 
Water. 
TOGETHER with all improvements and appurtenances 
thereunto belonging. 
EXCEPTING AND RESERVING all oil, gas and mineral 
r i g h t s . 
SUBJECT to all existing rights-of-way and easements of 
record. 
2. PURCHASE PRICE AMD METHOD OF PAYMENT: 
Buyer agrees and does now purchase the above described 
property and agrees to pay to the Seller therefor the sum of ONE 
HUNDRED FIFTY-TWO THOUSAND DOLLARS ($152,000.00) in lawful money 
a. A down payment in the sum of TWENTY-THREE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED 
DOLLARS ($2 3,500.00) the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged by the 
Seller from the Buyer. 
> b. The- remaining balance of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE 
HUNDRED DOLLARS ($120,500.00) be paid as follows.' Two equal yearly in-.!-, 
stallments of $26;395.18 each which includes principal and interest co 
due date. Three equal yearly installments of $40,234.16, each which 
includes principal, and interest to due date, such payments of larger 
amount being first due in 1983. Buyer also agrees that in the event of 
a late payment to pay any additional earned interest from the date said 
payment was clue to date of payment. The first payment shall be due one 
year from closing and all subsequent payments shall be due on the same 
date each year thereafter until interest and principal are paid in full. 
All payments shall first be applied to earned interest. 
3. EARLY PAYMENTS: 
It is agreed by and between the parties hereto that the Buyer may make 
early payments of amounts not yet due under the terms and conditions of 
this agreement, provided, however, that such early payments shall not 
release Buyer of the responsibility of making the regular installments 
required in provision 2. above. Said early payments, if any there be, shalJ 
be first applied to interest due and owing, and then shall be deducted 
from the total principal due and owing. 
4 . ESCROW AGENT.: 
The parties cio hereby mutually agree and by these presents constitute 
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., Roosevelt Office as their escrow agent 
to hold the papers and documents in connection herewith and to receive 
payment thereon and to perform such other acts as shall be required under 
the terms of this agreement by the escrow agent. 
It is mutually agreed between the parties hereto that the only obli-
gation imposed upon the escrow agent is to hold the papers in connection 
herewith and to receive the payments as made under the terms of this 
agreement.. The said escrow agent shall not be liable or obligated to 
send any notices of non-payment of non-compliance with the terms of 
p. (his contract. The parties 
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v k U I I C u u i u c u v j u a u c o / n x w i i U I L U L C O I . a u u t i c L a u c KJ L I VJ O p c i . a n n u m , 
on all unpaid balances as set forth below until paid rn full, to-
wit: 
a. A down payment in the sum of TWENTY-THREE THOUSAND FIVE 
HUNDRED DOLLARS ($23,500.00) the receipt of which is hereby 
acknowledged by the Seller from the Buyer. 
b. The remaining balance of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-EIGHT 
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($120,500.00) be paid as follows: 
Seven equal yearly installments of $26,395.18 each which includes 
principal and interest to due date. Buyer also agrees that in 
additional earned interest 
Basin Land Title & Abstract, Inc. 
Vernal 789-4724 Roosevelt 722-2391 
134 W Wain Suite 201 823 E. 2nd North 
P.O. Box 1423 
Thinus To Do Today 
Heroin attached page 3 has been 
replaced by page 2, which was 
rewritten and signed by Se l l er 
and Kuyer on December 19, 1980, 
at tho c l o s i n g . 
Noto: Escrow payment instruct ions 
agree with rewritten page 2 
as included in this Contract. 
IVrn I'.. Oorrhnnsly, Clos ina.'Agent 
tte of payment. The f i r s t 
.osing and a l l subsequent 
•ach year t h e r e a f t e r u n t i l 
.11. Al l payments s h a l l 
p a r t i e s here to that the 
t s not ye t due under the 
provided, however, that 
yer of the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
equired in p r o v i s i o n 2 . 
here be , s h a l l be f i r s t 
I then s h a l l be deducted 
- ~~j ..-wMUii/ avjj.ee and by these p r e s e n t s 
c o n s t i t u t e F i r s t S e c u r i t y Bank of Utah, N.A. , Roosevel t Off ice as 
t h e i r escrow agent to hold the papers and documents in connect ion 
herewith and to r e c e i v e payment thereon and to perform such other 
a c t s ,MS s h a l l be required under the terms of t h i s agreement by 
the escrow agent . 
It i s mutually agreed between the p a r t i e s here to that the 
only o b l i g a t i o n imposed upon the escrow agent i s to hold «the 
papers in connect ion herewith and to r e c e i v e the payments as made 
undoc the terms of t h i s agreement. The sa id escrow agent s h a l l 
not be l i a b l e or o b l i g a t e d to send any n o t i c e s of non-payment or 
of non-compliance with the terms of t h i s c o n t r a c t . The p a r t i e s 
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hereby agree that they will simultaneously with the execution of 
this contract, execute an escrow agreement which will govern 
their affairs concerning this escrow, and the said escrow agent 
shall be bound by said escrow agreement only. The failure of the 
parties hereto.to deposit the proper papers as herein provided 
shall not render the escrow agent liable for the same, and the 
escrow agent is under no obligation to examine or determine the 
marketability of title, genuineness or value of any document 
herein placed with the escrow agent to be held by it. 
It is mutually agreed between the Seller and Buyer that all 
contract and escrow costs shall be divided equally, 
5. PLACE OF PAYMENTS: 
tt is mutually understood and agreed between the parties 
hereto that after the execution of this agreement, that all 
payments of either principal and/or interest shall be made at the 
office of the escrow agent named above. 
6. TAXES AND POSSESSION: 
The parties further mutually agree that the Seller shall pay 
all taxes and assessments of any kind and nature that have 
accrued prior to the execution of this contract, and the Buyer 
shall pay all taxes and assessments after said date and for so 
I on*) ar, this omUr.iot .shall remain in I'oriM*. Tin* port. I mi .itjruo 
that possession of the said premises shall be as of the date of 
this agreement. 
7. ABSTRACT OF TITLE, WARRANTY DEED, ETC.: 
The parties hereto agree to deposit with the escrow agent 
the following instruments: 
Warranty Deed 
Quit Claim Deed 
The original of this Contract 
Notice of Interest In Real Estate Contract (copy) 
The Buyer acknowledges that the Seller has the option at the 
conclusion of this contract to either furnish the Buyer with an 
abstract of title extended to date, or to furnish the Buyer with 
u U.« i ' \ -»u\ uvs\- u \ m i-u.»ui\l ^>\v\ v l \ » \ l^, \ » \ \ \ r \ \ y , * : »? 'It!:' 
:-U W sW<N^r 
• • -• = • --^ --.« property shall be free and clear of all 
' '
s n c u
«
h
» n « 8 or h„perfections of title at the time of 
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final payment. 
8. INSURANCE: 
Since no personal property is being sold, and since no 
buildings are on the subject property, no insurance shall be 
required. 
9. FINAL PAYMENT: 
Upon final payment in full of the purchase price, the 
heretofore described instruments shall be delivered to Buyer by 
the escrow agent, with a receipt showing this agreement to be 
fully paid and discharged; and at that time there shall be 
inscribed across the face of this instrument the words, "PAID IN 
FULL", with the date thereof, and have the same initialed or 
signed by the proper authority of the escrow agent. 
10. COVENANTS: 
The Buyer agrees and covenants with the Seller to perform 
each and every duty imposed upon Buyer by the terms of this 
contract; to not commit any waste on said premises, nor permit 
any waste to be committed, as to injure the reversion or 
remaining equity of the Seller. Buyer has present right to 
continue to survey, subdivide and to obtain final approval for 
Diamond Acres Subdivision, during the pendency of this contract. 
11. REPRESENTATIONS: 
The parties hereto represent that they are familiar with the 
premises herein described and to be conveyed; that they have 
examined the same and Buyer accepts said property in. its present 
condition. The parties further agree that if there are other 
items of personalty thereon which are not included in this 
acjreomr-Mit, the exclusion or failure to list and designate the 
same does not indicate the retention by the Seller or the 
transfer of the same to the Buyer. 
12. TIME OF ESSENCE, GRACE AND DEFAULT: 
11 in I MI M U M I.|I .»mt 1 11.11 I hiii) HIUIII lit* M m HHMHIU'*» of Ml N 
jgn?ein«int and it the said Buyer shall fail to pay the 
installments due hereunder at the time herein specified or fail 
to keep any other covenant of said Buyer by this contract 
imposed, or fail to pay the taxes or assessments on the said 
property when the same shall become due, then and in that event, 
the Seller, after thirty (30) days after such default, shall have 
the following alternative remedies: 
A. Seller shall have the right, upon failure of the Buyer 
to remedy the default within five days after written notice, to 
be released from all obligations in law and in equity to convey 
said property, and all payments which have been made theretofore 
on this contract by the Buyer, shall be forfeited to the Seller 
as liquidated damages for the non-performance of the contract, 
and the Buyer agrees that the Seller may at his option re-enter 
and take possession of said premises without legal processes as 
in its first and former estate, together with all improvements 
and additions made by the Buyer thereon, and the said additions 
and improvements shall remain with the land and become the 
property of the Seller, the Buyer becoming at once a tenant at 
will of the Seller; or 
B. The Seller may bring suit and recover judgment for all 
delinquent installments, including costs and attorneys fees. 
(The use of this remedy on one or more occasions shall not 
prevent the Seller, at his option, from resorting to one of the 
other remedies hereunder in the event of a subsequent default); 
or 
C. The Seller shall have the right, at his option, and upon 
written notice to the Buyer, to declare the entire unpaid balance 
hereunder at once due and payable, and may elect to treat this 
contract as a note and mortgage, and pass title to the Buyer 
subject thereto, and proceed immediately to foreclose the same in 
accordance with the laws of the State of Utah, and have the 
property sold and the proceeds applied to the payment of the 
balance owing, including costs and attorney's fees; and the 
Seller may have a judgment for any deficiency which may remain. 
In the case of foreclosure, the Seller hereunder, upon the filing 
of a complaint, shall be immediately entitled to the appointment 
of j receiver to take possession of said mortgaged property and 
collect the rents, issues and profits therefrom and apply the 
same to the payment of the obligation hereunder, or hold the same 
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pursuant to order of the court; and the Seller, upon entry of 
judgment of foreclosure, shall be entitled to the possession of 
the said premises during the period of redemption. 
13. IN RE DEFAULT: 
It is mutually agreed between the parties hereto that in the 
event of default or failure of either of the parties hereto in 
the performance of the covenants imposed upon either of them by 
this contract, or in the payment of the installments or any other 
obligation herein provided, then such defaulting party agrees to 
pay all costs imposed, including a reasonable attorney's fee 
incurred in connection with the enforcement of the terms of this 
contract or the correction of any condition caused by the breach 
of any covenant or obligation herein contained and set forth. 
14. HEIRS, ASSIGNS AND TRANSFERABILITY: 
It is mutually agreed and covenanted that the provisions of 
this agreement shall apply to and bind the heirs, executors, 
administrators and assigns of the respective parties hereto. The 
Buyer hereby acknowledged that this agreement and any property 
herein sold cannot be bargained, sold or assigned to any other 
person or party without the written consent of the Seller first 
had and obtained. The Seller hereby covenants and agrees not to 
unreasonably withhold, consent from the Buyer, and that Seller 
will agree to Buyer assigning or transfering this agreement 
and/or the property herein sold, to a third party without 
requiring additional consideration or early payments, so long as 
the proposed third party shall establish evidence satisfactory to 
the Seller that the third party is both financially and otherwise 
a responsible person or party, and that said third party will 
agree in writing to abide by all of the terms and conditions of 
this agreement. The acceptance or agreement by the Seller to 
allow the Buyer to assign Buyer's interest herein to a third 
party, shall not release the Buyer from any obligation or duty 
herein imposed, unless otherwise agreed to in writing by the 
Seller. 
15. NOTICE OF INTEREST, QUIT-CLAIM, ETC.: 
Simultaneous with the execution of this contract, the 
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parties shall jointly execute a Notice of Interest in Real Estate 
Contract, which affidavit may be recorded by the Buyer. In 
addition, the Buyer shall execute a Quit-Claim Deed to escrow 
with this contract, quit-claiming any interest in the contract 
and property, to be released by the escrow agent ONLY upon Seller 
demonstrating to the escrow agent that proper notices were sent 
by the Seller to the Buyer, at the last known address of the 
Buyer, and that more than ten (10) days have elapsed since the 
last notice was received, and that the Buyer has not remedied his 
default. 
16. ADDRESSES: 
The current mailing addresses of each of the parties is as 
follows: 
SELLER BUYER 
Marvel Malnar Ferron Elder 
Box G 960 East 1050 North 
Neola, Utah 84053 Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Until either party shall notify the escrow agent, in 
writing, of a change of address, the above address may be relied 
upon by either party as being the proper address for sending 
notices to the other party. Proof of mailing by either party of 
any notice, etc., to the other party may be had in any of the 
customary procedures for establishing the same, and shall be 
conclusively established, if said address is relied upon. 
1 7 . LOT RELEASES: ^ ^ ^ ^ \fi+^ 
Upon payment of the sum of $2,200.00-'in addition to the 
annual payments herein required, Seller agrees to release 1 acre 
lots. The releases will be upon approval of Bow Valley Resources 
of Denver, Colorado. Buyer shall receive credit for all sums 
paid for lot releases on the last payments to become due. It is 
not intended that said $2T200"00 per acre should be extra 
consideration, but merely early payment for early release of the 
lot. 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF we have hereunto set our hands the day 
and year first above written. 
SELLER: 
MARVEL MALNAR 
BUYER: 
/ 
ERRON ELDER* 
STATE OF UTAH 
County of Duchesne ) ss. 
On this rf<* day of December, 1980, personally appeared 
before me MARVEL MALNAR as Seller; and FERRON ELDER, as Buyer; 
the signers of the foregoing instrument who duly acknowledged to 
me that they executed the same. 
My Commission Expires: Notary Public / 
Residing at: yf/c^A
 } IL?<LJ<~ 
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T - ... R E C O R D AT REQUEST C ^ - ^ 1 ^ - ^ ^ 
7 J ^ 1 & L L - DUCHESNE COUNTY RECORDER^  i/?**MZ*4^&lT* 
TNT'ERE'ST IN REAL PROPERTY 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss 
COUNTY OF DUCHESNE) 
TO WHO IT MAY CONCERN: 
Not ice Is hereby given that the undersigned has an I n t e r e s t In that c e r t a i n 
rea l property s i t u a t e d in D u c h e s n e County, S ta te of U t a h , described 
as f o l l o w s : 
TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 1 WEST, UINTAH SPECIAL MERIDIAN 
SECTION 34: West Half of the Nor thwes t Q u a r t e r , 
EXCEPTING t h e r e f r o m : Beg inn ing a t t h e N o r t h w e s t 
c o r n e r and r u n n i n g t h e n c e E a s t 1320 f e e t ; t h e n c e 
South 330 f e e t ; t h e n c e West 1320 f e e t ; t h e n c e 
Nor th 330 f e e t t o p o i n t of b e g i n n i n g . 
TOGETHER w i t h 12 s h a r e s of Dry Gulch I r r i g a t i o n 
Water , and i n c l u d i n g a i l improvements and a p p u r t e n a n c e s 
t h e r e u n t o b e l o n g i n g . 
SUBJECT to a l l e x i s t i n g e a s e m e n t s and r i g h t s - o f - w a y . 
ALL OIL, CAS, AND MINERAL RIGHTS r e s e r v e d by p r e v i o u s 
owner . 
Sold inU-rubL is evidenced by a C e r l a i n REAL ESTATE Contract 
dated December IV, l<j 80, by and between Marvel M a l n a r , aka 
Marvel L. Malnar 
as Seller and F e r r o n E l d e r as Buyers. 
Marvel Mainar _
 a Ferron Elder I 
a k a M a r v e l L . M a l n a r 
S e I l e r s Buyers 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss 
COUNTY OF DUCHESNE ) 
On the 1 9 t h day of D e c e m b e r , A.O. 19 8 0 , personal ly 
appeared before me Marvel Ma lna r , aka Marvel L. and F e r r o n E l d e r 
Malnar , 
the s i g n e r s of the w i t h i n i.ns.£ rumen t , who duly acknowledged to me that they 
executed the same. >v; \ % o \ V - \ £7 /? f)9 ' f ' 0 
:7 c; '*\ \-.',,'T?At.tr -if- &AMJ:/.«u%&<i 
' ; -C I :i, ' :? I \ \Nourry Publ ic 
My Commission expires ' I 'l ' / ,12/f?4 ',.. "Residing in N e o l a , U t & h 8 4 0 5 3 -
Honor. 
first. 
admission 
Q 
or Mrs.? 
A 
Q 
Agreement 
describes 
A 
Q 
MR. ORTON: We would offer Exhibit 27, Your 
MR. MADSEN: I would like to look at it j 
MR. ORTON: Sure. 
MR. MADSEN: I have no objection to the 
f Your Honor. 
THE COURT: What number, counsel? 
MR. ORTON: 27, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Exhibit 27 is received. 
(by Mr. Orton) I'm net sure Mrs. — Is it Miss 
I'll call you Ms. 
It's Mrs. 
Okay. Mrs. Houtz, referring to the Escrow J 
itself, the first page near the top which 
the documents being placed in escrow --
Yes. 
Let me ask you if the first document, to the best 
of your knowledge, was the Warranty Deed from Marve] Malnar j 
to Ferron Elder containing the entire 76 — Well, was the 
Warranty Deed from Marvel Malnar to Ferron Elder, which was 
to be recorded upon completion of the payments? 
A 
Q 
Yes. To my knowledge, it was. 
And that would have been the deed which covered 
the entire property; is that correct? 
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A 
Q 
anything 
covering 
A 
Q 
file? 
A 
deeds. 
Q 
That's correct. 
Is there any mention in the Escrow Agreement or 
in the file relating to another Warranty Deed 
only six acres? 
Not that I'm aware of. 
Could you take just a moment and look through the 
Sure. There is no other reference to any other 
The Quit-Claim Deed would be the deed which would 
be delivered to the seller in the event the buyer deifaulted, 
and the seller served a Notice of Default? 
A 
Q 
original 
whe Real 
A 
Q 
time she 
correct? 
A 
Q ,. 
acting on 
Yes. 
Thank you. In the original contract, and the 
contract was in the file and Notice of Interest in 
Estate Contract; is that right? 
Yes. 
And those were all returned to Mrs. Malnar at the 
obtained — signed the Escrow Release; is that 
Yes. 
To your knowledge, did the buyers or anyone else 
behalf of the buyers ever attempt in any way to 
delay Mrs. Malnar in getting her property back and in 
obtaining the papers in the file? 
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State of Utah 
jCounty of Duchesne ss. 
I, CAROLTOE^ I^ SIN ^
 f County Recorder 
in and for Duchesne County, hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and correct 
copy of the I L ^ O J M ^ 
Book..Number_A79^ ^ 
and now on file and of record in my office. 
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed 
the official seal of said office, this Mgk?k day of 
February 19...§8_. 
U County Recorder 
icorded at Request oL. 
2125.T4 /J -j f. to A*^ ^ J ,i:/J>.. 
rt.f'fy.U. F e e P a i d t , / ^ ^UA^^YJ). A*<A J^JJ 
by &. &/?<d&M*S 
Mail tax notice to Address-
WARRANTY DEED 
MARVEL L. MALNAR, a married woman, grantor 
of Neola .County of Duchesne , state of Utah, hereby 
CONVEY and WARRANT to 
FERRON C. ELDER, 
grantee 
of 960 Eas t , 1050 North, B o u n t i f u l , Utah for the sum of 
TEN and o t h e r good and va luab le c o n s i d e r a t i o n DOLLARS, 
the follow ins: described tract of land in Duchesne County, 
State of Utah: 
Beginning a t the Northwest 'cornel : o f S e c t i o n 34 , 
Township 2 South , Range 1 West, Uintah S p e c i a l Meridian 
and running thence East 6 3 0 , 0 r f e e t ; thence South 2 3 0 . 0 
f e e t ; thence East 550 .0 f e e t ; thence South 1 0 0 . 0 f e e t 
more o r l e s s t o the South l i n e o f the North Half of the 
North Half o f the Northwest quar ter o f t h e Northwest 
Quarter of s a i d s e c t i o n ; thence West 1 1 8 0 . 0 f e e t more or 
less t o t h e West l i n e of s a i d S e c t i o n ; thence North 330 .0 
f e e t more or l e s s t o the p o i n t o f b e g i n n i n g . 6 .04 a c r e s 
more or l e s s . 
WITNESS, the hand of said grantor , this 19th day of 
December , A. D. 19 8 0 
Signed in the Presence of 
M a r v e l L . M a l n a r 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County of DUCHESNE 
On the 19 t h day of December , A. D. 19 80 
personally appeared before me MARVEL MALNAR, a k a M a r v e l L . M a l n a r , 
the signer of the within instrument^whp#>duly acknowledged to me that she executed the 
same. ..""• • V*mm\2m »•» »,\ 
. . . . . . . -—„-. Public 
My commission expire* ' • V ^ ^ a jffifregMhg to N e o l a ' u t a h " 8 4 0 5 3 
1 V l 4 " ^ £ - i V V i * L _ 
i i 
~B l^NK'ffioP^-WAWIIAHTT PlKO—'-<Q OtM'rfxiTXpIj^ 311* SO^tflOS JtASt>= 3ACT XAKK.ClTV==S^r~ 
$780 an acre? 
A 1 never had any indication made to me as to what 
she had p^id for it. 
MR. ORTON: No further questions. 
MR. MADSEN: No questions. 
THE COURT: Let's see — The Court has a 
question, Mr. Elder. You testified about this, but it kind 
of went by me a little bit too fast. The Warranty Deed to 
the six acres — again tell me how that deed came into your 
possession. I take it you did not arrange for its 
recording? I think you told me sonie attorney did that. 
Tell me who that was. 
THE WITNESS: The clos in g officer, Fern 
Oberhansly, the escrow -- And everything was done in her 
office with Steve Malnar and Mrs. Marvel Malnar and myself 
present. And at the time t! lat 1:1 ie document — Fern 
Oberhansly typed the document and Mrs. Malnar signed it. 
Mrs. Oberhansly then recorded it and mailed that to me 
registered mail. 
THE COURT: And what was her capacity? 
THE WITNESS: She was the closing officer. 
THE COURT: Who did she work for? 
THE WITNESS: She worked for — It's right 
on the top of one of those documents. I can't remember the 
name. 
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THE COURT: 
THE WITNESS 
THE COURT: 
statements, perhaps? 
MRS. ORTON: 
THE COURT: 
Is she with the title company? 
: The title company,, yes. | 
Would they be with the closing! 
I think it's Basin Land Title. 
Oh, yes. Here it is. She's the 
closing agent for the title company? 
THE WITNESS 
THE COURT: 
i That's correct. 
I see. Well, that's clear to me 
now . You rushed over that, and I wasn't sure who she was 
with. Any questions on that? 
MR. ORTON: 
MR. MADSEN: 
THE COURT: 
step down. 
MR. ORTON; 
Honor? 
MR. MADSEN: 
THE COURT: 
excused. Thank you. 
MR. ORTON: 
No, Your Honor. 
No. 
All right. Thank you. You may 
May Mr. Elder be excused, Your 
No objection. 
All right. Mr. Elder, you're 
We'll call Sheila Houtz, Your 
Honor. Your Honor, I've called her — subpoenaed her for 
the purpose of bringing the i escrow file from First Security 
Bank. And I'm not sure how the Court will want to handle 
that or how she will want ' bo handle it. The thing I would 
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ASSIGNMENT OF CLAIMS AND CAUSE OF ACTION 
THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into in Salt Lake City, 
State of Utah, on the ^Q3j&Lday of January, 1987, by and between 
CLARK JENKINS, THOMAS C. MABEY, J. McRAY JOHNSON, RICHARD 
McCARVER and FERRON C. ELDER, hereinafter referred to as 
"Assignors", and A. LA3RUM & SONS, INC., a Utah Corporation, 
ARVIN L. BELLON, MAURINE G. BELLON, B. CURTIS DASTRUP and LANIS 
B. DASTRUP, hereinafter referred to as "Assignees". 
W I T N E S S E T H : 
WHEREAS, Assignors are Plaintiffs in an action now pending 
in the Seventh Judicial District Court of Duchesne County, State 
of Utah, Civil Action No. 85 CV 187D, in which action Assignors 
are named as Plaintiffs and Marvel L. Malner is named as 
Defendant; and 
WHEREAS, by said action Assignors are attempting to recover 
money damages and real property from Marvel L, Malner under a 
theory of equitable restitution of monies and properties 
allegedly forfeited under a Real Estate Contract; and 
WHEREAS, the parties hereto have entered into a Settlement 
Agreement of even date herewith by the terms of which Assignors, 
for good and valuable consideration, have agreed to assign to 
Assignees said cause of action and all claims made therein; and 
WHEREAS, Assignees desire to acquire from Assignors all of 
Assignors1 right, title and interest in and to said cause of 
action and all claims made therein. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants 
hereinafter set forth, including, but not limited to, that 
certain Settlement Agreement of even date herewith, it is hereby 
agreed as follows: 
1. Assignors do hereby assign to Assignees all of 
their right, title and interest in and to the legal action 
hereinabove referred to and all claims made by Assignors in said 
iction. 
2. That henceforth Assignees shall be responsible for 
prosecuting said action through counsel of their choice, 
3. Assignors shall fully cooperate with Assignees in 
:he prosecution of said action and agree to appear as witnesses 
ind to provide such information and documents as are reasonably 
tecessary for the purpose of prosecuting said action, 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement 
2 
the day and year f i r s t above mentioned. 
ASSJG2T0RS: 
rarlc oT^hKins 
lomas C. M^hey / 
Richard McCarver 
Ferron C.Elae Ler 
Witness 
ASSIGNEES: 
A. LABRUM & SONS, INC., 
A Ut< 
By ^^^t^^^^^ ^ / ^ t ^ ^ ^ 1 
7i ts frA,J4%Ji\ 
WWs\^r=^ 
si Arvin L. Bellon 
Mauj^ ii^ e-^ G .^ E^ellon. 
B.Curtis Dastrup / 
^ 2 . 
W i t n e s s 
& 
L a n i s B . ' D a s t r u p ~ ~ I T 
/ ^ 
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ROBERT F. ORTON - #A2483 
JAMIS M. JOHNSON - #A3736 
MARSDEN, ORTON & CAHOON 
ATTORNEYS FOR MOVANTS 
68 SOUTH MAIN STREET, FIFTH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
TELEPHONE: (801) 521-3800 
\-\uzu 
KhDISTRlCTCOURTDUCHESN 
FEB 121987 
ROGER K.MARETT, Clerk 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CLARK JENKINS, FERRON C. 
ELDER, RICHARD McCARVER, 
THOMAS C. MABEY, and 
J. McRAY JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARVEL L. MALNAR, 
Defendant. 
ENTRY OF APPEARANCE OF 
COUNSEL, MOTION FOR 
SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES 
PLAINTIFF AND NOTICE OF 
HEARING ON MOTION 
Civil No. 85-CV-187D 
ROBERT F. ORTON and JAMIS M. JOHNSON of the firm of the 
firm of MARSDEN, ORTON & CAHOON, enter their appearance herein 
for Movants, Arvin L. Bellon, Maurine G. Bellon, B. Curtis 
Dastrup, Lanis B. Dastrup, and A. Labrum & Sons, Inc., and 
Movants, through counsel, move the Court for an Order 
substituting them as party Plaintiffs for and in the place of 
Plaintiffs, Clark Jenkins, Ferron C. Elder, Richard McCarver, 
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Thomas C. MaP^Y and J. McRay Johnson. 
This Motion is made pursuant to the provisions of Rule 
25\c) oi tYie 'O'tah "Rules of Oivil "Procedure, upon fne grounds and 
for the reason that on the 30th day of January, 1987, the 
Plaintiffs above-named, for good and valuable consideration, 
assigned to Movants all of their right, title and interest in and 
to this legal action and all claims made by Plaintiffs herein. A 
copy of said Assignment of Claims and Cause of Action is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A" and by this reference made a part hereof. 
This Motion is supported by the Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities which is filed herewith. 
DATED this day of February, 1987. 
ROBERT F. ORTON 
JAMIS M. JOHNSON 
MARSDEN, ORTON & CAHOON 
Attorneys for Movants 
NOTICE OF HEARING ON MOTION 
TO THE PARTIES ABOVE-NAMED AND TO THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD: 
You and each of you will please take notice that the 
Motion of Arvin L. Bellon, Maurine G. Bellon, B. Curtis Dastrup, 
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Lanis B. Dasltrup and A. Labrum & Sons, Inc., for substitution of 
parties Plaintiff, will come on regularly for hearing before a 
judge of the above-entitled Court at the Duchesne County 
Courthouse in Duchesne, Utah, on Tuesday, the 24th day of 
February, 1987, at 10:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel 
can be heard* 
Govern yourselves accordingly. 
DATED this /ITL~ day of February, 1987. 
ROBERT F. ORTON 
JAMIS M. JOHNSON 
MARSDEN, ORTON & CAH00N 
Attorneys for Movants 
EXHIBIT "A" 
ASSIGNMENT OF CLAIMS AND CAUSE OF ACTION 
THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into in Salt Lake City, 
State of Utah, on the J^Q^Lday of January, 1987, by and between 
CLARK JENKINS, THOMAS C. MABEY, J. McRAY JOHNSON, RICHARD 
McCARVER and FERRON C. ELDER, hereinafter referred to as 
"Assignors", and A. LA3RUM & SONS, INC., a Utah Corporation, 
ARVIN L. BELLON, MAURINE G. BELLON, B. CURTIS DASTRUP and LANIS 
B. DASTRUP, hereinafter referred to as "Assignees". 
W I T N E S S E T H : 
WHEREAS, Assignors are Plaintiffs in an action now pending 
in the Seventh Judicial District Court of Duchesne County, State 
of Utah, Civil Action No. 85 CV 187D, in which action Assignors 
are named as Plaintiffs and Marvel L. Malner is named as 
Defendant; and 
WHEREAS, by said action Assignors are attempting to recover 
money damages and real property from Marvel L. Malner under a 
theory of equitable restitution of monies and properties 
allegedly forfeited under a Real Estate Contract; and 
WHEREAS, the parties hereto have entered into a Settlement 
Agreement of even date herewith by the terms of which Assignors, 
for good and valuable consideration, have agreed to assign to 
2 n 
Assignees said cause of action and all claims made therein; and 
WHEREAS, Assignees desire to acquire from Assignors all of 
Assignors1 right, title and interest in and to said cause of 
action and all claims made therein. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants 
hereinafter set forth, including, but not limited to, that 
certain Settlement Agreement of even date herewith, it is hereby 
agreed as follows: 
1. Assignors do hereby assign to Assignees all of 
their right, title and interest in and to the legal action 
hereinabove referred to and all claims made by Assignors in said 
action. 
2. That henceforth Assignees shall be responsible for 
prosecuting said action through counsel of their choice. 
3. Assignors shall fully cooperate with Assignees in 
the prosecution of said action and agree to appear as witnesses 
and to provide such information and documents as are reasonably 
necessary for the purpose of prosecuting said action. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement 
2 
30 
the day and year first above mentioned. 
ASSIGNORS: 
Witness 
'witness 
\W^ K , 
Richard McCarver v-» 
Ferron C. Eld er 
ASSIGNEES: 
A. LABRUM & SONS, INC., 
A UtahnCorporation 
By ^ -v^^<^ 
Arvin L. Bellon 
G.^fiellon. 
} £)&A1AA,^ 
B~. fcurtis Dastrup / 
^2. 
*^*^r 
Lanis B. D a s t r u p 1 / 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
1 , being first duly sworn, 
2 says that she is employed in the law firm of MARSDEN, ORTON & 
3 CAHOON, Attorneys for Movants
 t herein; that she 
4 served the attached ENTRY OF APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL, MOTION FOR 
5 SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES PLAINTIFF AND NOTICE OF HEARING ON MOTION 
6 (Civil No. 85-CV-187D j# upon the parties listed below by 
7 I placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed 
to the following and causing the same to be mailed first class, 
9
 I postage prepaid, on the \ V^ day of February
 f i g 8 7 
10 
Gordon A. Madsen, Esq. 
11 I 5296 South 320 West, Suite 101 
Murray, Utah 84107 
12 ",. 
J. Rand Hirschi, Esq. 
13 || PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
175 East 400 South 
14 || Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
Februa ry , 1987. 
^ M T/i^tAo 
3 || NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
24 I My Comm. Expires: 
1-15-88 
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ROBERT F. ORTON - #A2483 
JAMIS M. JOHNSON - #A3736 
MARSDEN, ORTON & CAHOON 
ATTORNEYS FOR MOVANTS 
68 SOUTH MAIN STREET, FIFTH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
TELEPHONE: (801) 521-3800 
fXUdLJ 
thDISTRlCTCOuRTDuCHESN 
FEB 231987 
ROGER K.MARETT, Clerk 
0? 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CLARK JENKINS, FERRON C. 
ELDER, RICHARD McCARVER, 
THOMAS C. MABEY, and 
J. McRAY JOHNSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MARVEL L. MALNAR, 
Defendant. 
STIPULATION FOR 
SUBSTITUTION OF 
PARTIES 
Civil No. 85-CV-187D 
Plaintiffs, Clark Jenkins, Ferron C. Elder, Richard 
McCarver, Thomas C. Mabey and J. McRay Johnson, through their 
counsel of record, and Defendant, Marvel L. Malnar, through her 
counsel of record, hereby stipulate and agree to the entry of an 
order substituting Arvin L. Bellon, Maurine G. Bellon, B. Curtis 
Dastrup, Lanis B. Dastrup and A. Labrum & Sons, Inc., as parties 
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Plaintiff, for and in the place of Plaintiffs, Clark Jenkins, 
Ferron C. Elder, Richard McCarver, Thomas C. Mabey and J. McRay 
Johnson, as prayed in the Motion for Substitution of Parties 
Plaintiff which is on file herein. 
DATED this 'Ml day of February, 1987. 
;scha 
PRflNCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
£^&s_j£2i 
"'"Gordon A. Madsen 
Attorney for Defendant 
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ROBERT F. ORTON - #A2483 
JAMIS M. JOHNSON - #A3736 
MARSDEN, ORTON & CAHOON 
ATTORNEYS FOR MOVANTS 
68 SOUTH MAIN STREET, FIFTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84 
TELEPHONE: (801) 521-3800 
, .n DISTRICT COURTDUCHES; T 
MAY 2 ' 1337 
R0(3thr\.ivirtritn, Clerk 
III FL2°?MV- ? ")'J:7 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CLARK JENKINS, FERRON C. 
ELDER, RICHARD McCARVER, 
THOMAS C. MABEY, and 
J. McRAY JOHNSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MARVEL L. MALNAR, 
Defendant. 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION 
FOR SUBSTITUTION OF 
PARTIES PLAINTIFF 
Civil No. 85-CV-187D 
On motion of Arvin L. Bellon, Maurine G. Bellon, B. Curtis 
Dastrup, Lanis B. Dastrup and A. Labrum & Sons, Inc., supported 
by the Memorandum of Points and Authorities which was filed 
therewith and the Stipulation of the parties which is on file 
herein; and the Court being fully advised in the premises and 
good cause appearing, 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Arvin L. Bellon, 
Maurine G. Bellon, B. Curtis Dastrup, Lanis B. Dastrup and A, 
Labrum & Sons, Inc., be and they are hereby substituted a« 
parties Plaintiff in the place of Plaintiffs, Clark Jenkins, 
Ferron C. Elder, Richard McCarver, Thomas C. Mabey and J. McRa^ 
Johnson. ,/~/-t- . ,^ 
DATED this /"T^ day of February, 1987. 
- ^ 
-?. £T^C 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT: 
-j-^r J./Rand H^rschi 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
zZfjti-
Gordon A, Madsen 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DESERET GENERATION & 
TRANSMISSION CO-OPERATIVE 
A UTAH CORPORATION, 
PLAINTIFF, 
VS. 
FERRON ELDER, ET AL., 
DEFENDANTS. 
\-\i_cXJ— 
7th DISTRICT COURT DUCHES"' 
AUG1VI985 
R U L I N G ROGER K.MABEn, Clerk 
3y ®? Dec. 
CIVIL NO. 7732 
The Court is called upon in this case to determine the 
fair market value of the property taken as well as any 
severance damages occasioned by the take. To do so, the 
highest and best use must first be determined. 
H 4ffc *** Vr-^'m r" * L^jttim'?!?'^' mmnmmafftsit 
The Court rejects the idea that the highest and 
best use at that time was a planned unit development and 
particularly the one pictured at trial. It was pointed out 
that the project would be developed in phases. While Phase 
I would be constructed some distance from the site of the 
right-of-way, that site would remain investment property 
with future residential development. 
Once the highest and best use has been determined, it 
is possible to determine the accuracy of the comparables and 
opinions of value. In this case the opinions, expert and 
non-expert, varied from $3,000.00 per acre to $8,500.00 per 
acre before the take. Given the comparables and the state 
of the basin economy at that time, the Court finds the value 
of the subject property on October 18, 1982 before the take 
to be $4,000.00 per acre. 
Next we must consider the nature of the taking of the 
right-of-way. Opinions on this varied from taking 100% of 
value to 70% of value. Clearly, the right-of-way has some 
residual value however slight. In this case, the Court 
finds that the right-of-way will take 90% of the value. 
Thus the value of the taking of the right-of-way is 
calculated as follows: 
10.42 acres x $4,000.00 x 90% = $37,512. 
The highest and best use of both parts of the remainder 
after the take remains the same. There are two large 
parcels remaining which can still be developed. However, 
^^^^£^^^^H^^^^^^^^^0^» It 
will be necessary to place improvements within the right-of-
way which will bring no return but which will tie the two 
remainder parcels together. The Court finds the diminution 
in value to be $40,000. When added to the right-of-way 
value, the Court awards a total sum of $77,512. 
Counsel for Plaintiff is directed to file appropriate 
orders in this case. 
DATED this 3(0 day of July, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
cc: F. Elgin Ward & Gary A. Dodge 
John P. Ashton 
Michael R. Labrum 
Steve Nelson 
Flying Diamond Ranches, Inc. 
Gordon A. Madsen 
Robert F. Orton 
United States Department of Agriculture 
STATE OF UTAH > 
County Of Duchesne } zs< 
f;}rf in #ry oMse. 
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78-34-9. Occupancy of premises pending action — Deposit 
paid into court — Procedure for payment of com-
pensation. 
The plaintiff may move the court cr a judge thereof, at any time after the 
commencement of suit, on notice to the defendant, if he is a resident of the 
state, or has appeared by attorney in the action, otherwise by serving a notice 
directed to him on the clerk of the court, for an order permitting the plaintiff 
to occupy the premises sought to be condemned pending the action, including 
appeal, and to do such work thereon as may be required. The court or a judge 
thereof shall take proof by affidavit or otherwise of the value of the premises 
sought to be condemned and of the damages which will accrue from the con-
demnation, and of the reasons for requiring a speedy occupation, and shall 
grant or refuse the motion according to the equity of the case and the relative 
damages which may accrue to the parties. If the motion is granted, the court 
or judge shall enter its order requiring the plaintiff as a condition precedent to 
occupancy to file with the clerk of the court a sum equivalent to at least 75/% 
of the condemning authority's appraised valuation of the property sought to 
be condemned. The amount thus fixed shall be for the purposes of the motion 
only, and shall not be admissible in evidence on final hearing. The rights of 
the just compensation for the land so taken or damaged shall vest in the 
parties entitled thereto, and said compensation shall be ascertained and 
awarded as provided in § 78-34-10 and established by judgment therein, and 
the said judgment shall include, as part of the just compensation awarded, 
interest at the rate of S/°/c per annum on the amount finally awarded as the 
value of the property and damages, from the date of taking actual possession 
thereof by the plaintiff or order of occupancy, whichever is earlier, to the date 
of judgment; but interest shall not be allowed on so much thereof as shall have 
been paid into court. Upon the application of the parties in interest, the court 
shall order the money deposited in the court be paid forthwith for or on ac-
count of the just compensation to be awarded in the proceeding. A payment to 
a defendant as aforesaid shall be held to be an abandonment by such defen-
dant of all defenses excepting his claim for greater compensation. If the com-
pensation finally awarded in respect of such lands, or any parcel thereof, shall 
exceed the amount of the money so received the court shall enter judgment 
against the plaintiff for the amount of the deficiency. If the amount of money 
so received by the defendant is greater than the amount finally awarded, the 
court shall enter judgment against the defendant for the amount of the excess. 
Upon the filing of the petition for immediate occupancy the court shall fix the 
time within which, and the terms upon which, the parties in possession shall 
be required to surrender possession to the plaintiff. The court shall make such 
orders in respect to encumbrances, liens, rents, assessments, insurance and 
other charges, if any, as shall be just and equitable. 
Use or improvement of highway as establish-
ing grade necessary to entitle abutting owner 
to compensation on subsequent change, 2 
A.L.R.3d 985. 
Valuation at time of original wrongful entry 
by condemner or at time of subsequent initia-
tion of condemnation proceedings, 2 A.L.R.3d 
1038. 
Restrictive covenant or right to enforcement 
thereof as compensable property right, 4 
A.L.R.3d 1137. 
Depreciation in value, from project for which 
land is condemned, as factor in fixing compen-
sation, 5 A.L.R.3d 901. 
Zoning as factor in determination of dam-
ages in eminent domain, 9 A.L.R.3d 291. 
How to obtain a jury trial in eminent do-
main: waiver, 12 A.L.R.3d 7. 
Admissibility of hearsay evidence as to com-
parable sales of other land as basis for expert's 
opinion as to land value, 12 A.L.R.3d 1064. 
Deduction of benefits in determining com-
pensation or damages in proceedings involving 
opening, widening, or otherwise altering high-
way, 13 A.L.R.3d 1149. 
Propriety and effect, in eminent domain pro-
ceeding, of argument or evidence as to land-
owner's unwillingness to sell property, 17 
A.L.R.3d 1449. 
Propriety and effect, in eminent domain pro-
ceeding, of argument or evidence as to source 
of funds to pay for property, 19 A.L.R.^d 694. 
Propriety and effect, in eminent domain pro-
ceeding, of instruction to the jury as to land-
owner's unwillingness to sell property, 20 
A.L.R.3d 1081. 
Propriety and effect of argument or evidence 
condemnation of public property, 40 A.L.R.3d 
143. 
Measure and elements of damage for limita-
tion of access caused by conversion of conven-
tional road into limited-access highway, 42 
A.L.R.3d 148. 
Measure of damages for condemnation of 
cemetery lands, 42 A.L.R.3d 1314. 
Traffic noise and vibration from highway as 
element of damages in eminent domain, 51 
A.L.R.Sd 860. 
Condemned property's location in relation to 
proposed site of building as factor in fixing 
compensation, 51 A.L.R.3d 1050. 
Loss of liquor license as compensable in con-
demnation proceeding, 56 A.L.R.3d 581. 
Goodwill or "going concern" value as ele-
ment of lessee's compensation for taking lease-
hold in eminent domain, 58 A.L.R.3d 581. 
Compensation for diminution in value of the 
remainder of property resulting from taking or 
use of adjoining land of others for the same 
undertaking, 59 A.L.R.3d 488. 
Consideration of fact that landowner's re-
maining land will be subject to special assess-
ment as factor in fixing compensation, 59 
A.L.R.3d 534. 
Condemner's liability for costs of condem-
nee's expert witnesses, 68 A.L.R.3d 546. 
Right in eminent domain proceeding to call 
as witness expert engaged but not called as 
witness by opposing party, 71 A.L.R.3d 1119. 
Determination of just compensation for con-
demnation of billboards or other advertising 
signs, 73 A.L.R.3d 1122. 
Key Numbers. — Eminent Domain <§=> 122 
et seq. 
78-34-11. When right to damages deemed to have accrued. 
For the purpose of assessing compensation and damages, the right thereto 
shall be deemed to have accrued at the date of the service of summons, and its 
actual value at that date shall be the measure of compensation for all property 
to be actually taken, and the basis of damages to property not actually taken, 
but injuriously affected, in all cases where such damages are allowed, as 
provided in the next preceding section [§ 78-34-101. No improvements put 
upon the property subsequent to the date of service of summons shall be 
included in the assessment of compensation or damages. 
518 
ule 19. Joinder of persons needed for just adjudication. 
(a) Persons to be joined if feasible. A person who is subject to service of 
ocess and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the 
bject matter of action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his 
sence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) 
claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated 
at the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter 
pair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the 
rsons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, mul-
ile, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If 
58 
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he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party. If he 
should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or, 
in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue 
and his joinder would render the venue of the action improper, he shall be 
dismissed from the action. 
(b) Determination by court whenever joinder not feasible. If a person 
as described in Subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court 
shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should 
proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person 
being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the 
court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's ab-
sence might be prejudicial to him or those already parties; second, the extent 
to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or 
other measure, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a 
judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether 
the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for non-
joinder. 
(c) Pleading reasons for nonjoinder. A pleading asserting a claim for 
relief shall state the names, if known to the pleader, of any persons as de-
scribed in Subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof who are not joined, and the reasons 
why they are not joined. 
(d) Exception of class actions. This rule is subject to the provisions of 
Rule 23. 
{Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amend-
ment rewrote Subdivisions (a) to (c) and added 
Subdivision (d). 
ANALYSIS 
Discretion of court. 
Indispensable parties. 
—Failure to join. 
Assertion for first time at trial. 
Assertion for first time on appeal. 
Dismissal not bar to action on merits. 
—Partner in joint venture. 
—Two-part inquiry. 
Necessary parties. 
—Corporate stock transfers. 
—Definition. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 19, F.R.C.P. 
v. Capital City Bank, 100 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 
(Ct. App. 1989). 
Indispensable parties. 
—Failure to join. 
Trial court abused its discretion in dismiss-
ing an action with prejudice for failure to join 
indispensable parties, and not allowing an 
amendment or granting a continuance, where 
defendant claimed no surprise but merely re-
lied on the likelihood of increased costs and 
complexity if the amendment were granted. In-
termountain Physical Medicine Assocs. v. Mi-
cro-Dex Corp., 739 P.2d 1131 (Utah Ct. ADD. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
* State of Utah 
County of Duchesne 
( ss. 
I, CMQLYNE^MADSEN , County Recorder 
in and for Duchesne County, hereby certify tha t the foregoing is a full, true and correct 
copy of the EOTRY^Kn^ER^^ 
B o o O u m b e r ^ _ 
and n o w on file and of record in m y office. 
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed 
the official seal of said office, this.....-.....?i8hth^ £ay Qf 
February 19...?.?... 
^^t^U^Z. 
County Recorder 
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b%.\QcuJ^M*^uA tuO. Dep. KookJL//A- Pase.3^-3... Rcf.: 
Mail tax notice to A6drcs$.„^Sfa-3.&..iZ&^£&^ 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
FERRON ELDER grantor 
°* Rooseve l t » County of Duchesne , State of Utah, hereby QUIT-CLAIM to 
MARVEL MALNAR , aka MARVEL L . MALNAR, 
grantee 
of R o o s e v e l t , County o f Duchesne, S t a t e of Utah for the sum of 
TEN and NO/100 DOLLARS, 
the following described tract o( land in Duchesne County, 
State of Utah: 
TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 1 WEST, U.S.M. 
Section 34: West half of Northwest quarter 
LESS: 4 acres m/1 Beginning 630 feet from the Northwest 
cornervof Section 34, running East 690 feet 
South 330 feet West 140 feet North 100 feet West 
550 feet North 230 feet to the point of beginning. 
TOGETHER with 12 shares of Class D Dry Gulch Irrigation 
water. 
TOGETHER with all improvements and appurtenances 
thereunto belonging. 
EXECEPTING AND RESERVING all oil, gas and mineral rights. 
SUBJECT to all existing rights-of-way and easements of 
record. 
WITNESS the hand of said grantor , this 19 th day of 
December » A. D. one thousand nine hundred and Eighty 
Signed in the presence 
h STATE OF UTAH, County of Duchesne 
On the 19th day of December A. D. one 
thousand nine hundred and Eighty personally appeared before me 
FERRON ELDER 
the signer of the foregoing instrument, .who duly acknowledge to me that he executed the 
same. 
\ •/ '/ ' • ' s/ a / Notary Public 
My commission expires *jy/"*fff Address: /fCtt^- / Odd* 3¥053 
/ 
DLANK NO. 103— O CCM MO. CO. — SaiS SO. 2COO CAST — SAtT LAKC CITY 
A That's correct. 
Q You don't understand any of the facts surrounding 
it or what consideration was paid for it or anything at all? 
A I'm sure there was consideration. I wasn't 
involved in that. 
THE COURT: You said that your interest was 
one ninth; didn't you? 
THE WITNESS: Well, what he's saying is why 
would they — why would the Warranty Deed go from me to 
Didericksen. 
THE COURT: You told me a little while ago 
there was an agreement, and that all of you in this 
partnership would put it in his name. Now, that's what's in 
tl e record. 
THE WITNESS: That's all I'm aware of. 
THE COURT: And that the consideration you 
got from the deed was your one ninth interest in the 
partnership. I don't see any confusion about that. 
Q (by Mr. Madsen) Let me get at it this way, Your 
Honor. The partnership was created wit you in it before 
this deed; isn't that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q And in the partnership, you got a one-ninth 
interest, and Mr. Didericksen got one-ninth interest? 
A Yes. 
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Q And all of you had one-ninth interest in the 
partnership? 
A Yes. 
Q And the whole tract of land went into the 
partnership that you had previously assigned to Jenkins and 
some lesser number of people; correct? 
A that's correct. 
Q Then thereafter you personally deed that interest 
now belonging to the partnership — personally from you to 
Didericksen; is that correct? 
A I suppose part of it was the fact that maybe it 
hadn't been recorded. the partnership just retained the 
Warranty Deed that I had as — without — 
Q The deed is dated when? 
THE COURT: Mr. Madsen, the deed speaks for 
itself. He's explained why. Let's get on with it. 
Q (by Mr. Madsen) It was executed and recorded a ' 
year later; is that right? 
A That's correct. 
Q Are you saying that Didericksen somehow had an 
interest in that six acres that he put into the partnership ' 
for his ..inth interest? 
A It seems so. 
Q Where did he get the one-ninth interest of the 
previous six acres? Had you previously deeded that to him? 
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. indeed the Court construed or concludes that by virtue of 
the funds the plaintiffs and their predecessor acts 
regarding the whole parcel of land, that the default is on 
it, that they took acts that are in opposition to our 
acquiring marketable title. Those funds have been eaten up. 
THE COURT: Of course, Mr. Madsen, when I 
hear your allegations, it seems to me we're getting into 
areas that haven't been plead in this case; such areas as, 
of course, the interference with marketable title. It seems 
to me, if we should get into that issue, there should be 
some counter claim taken such as slander of title --
MR. MADSEN: I don't believe that — 
THE COURT: Let me please finish my 
statement, Mr. Madsen, because the fact that somebody filed 
and says: "I claim an interest in your property," doesn't 
make it so. That's true. It's true, it might make some 
title company so that they can't pass it on, but it doesn't 
create an interest. If that's the case, and the deeds are 
on file, I'll rule they have no interest on your property; 
you see what I mean. But if you're getting into areas where 
you're claiming she has interfered with your marketable 
title, and you're claiming so much damage as an offset, to 
get into this, you've got, it would seem to me, you've go to 
do that — I don't think you can do it without pleading it. 
That's the way it appears to me. 
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. MR. MADSEN: We're not pleading for a counter 
claim here, we're --
THE COURT: Well, you have to plead an 
offset. 
MR. MADSEN: That's done by denial. 
THE COURT:. Oh, no. That's affirmative 
relief you're asking me for — you see what I mean? Unless 
Mr Orton is willing try that issue without object, I don't 
see how we can get into that at all. 
MR. ORTON: This is the first we've heard of 
that, and it would come as a complete surprise to us. 
MR. MADSEN: Another problem we've had was 
showing in this condemnation action — 
THE COURT: I'm only interested in the 
property at the time of the default; and anything that's 
gone on since then, of course, regarding the condemnation -
Well, yes. They're saying — they're asking that be a 
credit to what they owed, which according to your statement, 
if prove it, I think you're probably right. Because the 
default was in, and it was here property, and they come in 
and finally condemn it, and they don't appear and defend. 
She's entitled to that because it was her property. But I'm 
also stuck with the value of the pi operty at the time of the 
default and anything that's gone on after. In other words, 
there is no way of predicting what the future is going to 
23 
Case and Amt. Sought Contract Actual 
Cite as Lig. Dmgs Price Damages 
(DISPROPORTIONATE) 
Soffe v. Ridd 
659 P.2d 1082 (1983) $ 20,725 $ 57,500 $ 5,895 
Allen v. K1ngdon 
723 P.2d 394 (1986) 10,800 87,500 3,746 
This Case 111,265 152,000 40,082 
Perkins v. Spencer 
243 P.2d 446 (1952) 2,725 10,500 1,030 
Johnson v. Carman 
572 P.2d 371 (1977) 34,596 170,000 25,650 
Average (of reported cases) 
(REASONABLE) 
ami1 ton 
6,630 22,000 4,590 
30,462 63,000 28,763 
326 P.2d 712 (1958) 36,788 75,000 35,000 
Warner v. Rasmussen 
704 P.2d 559 (1985) 13,994 57,000 13,669 
Cole v. Parker 
300 P.2d 623 (1956) 11,600 40,000 15,000 
Carlson i 
332 P.2d 
Strand v 
384 P.2d 
7. Hamilton 
930 (1958)
. Mayne 
396 
Peck v. Judd 
(1963) 
Average 
352% 
288% 
278% 
15 m. 10 d. 
0 d. 
37.5 m. 
26.15% 
Infini 
23% 
Percent of Percent of 
Lig. Dmgs Lig, Dmgs. 
to Contract to Actual Period of % Annual 
Price Damages Possession Return 
34% 
12% 
73% 
26% 265% 6 in. 52% 
20% 134% 1 y. 21 d. 18.6% 
23% 260% 32% 
34% 140% 24 m. 17% 
48% 106% 34 m. 22. 15% 
49% 105% 61 m. 5.71% 
30% 102% 24 m. 15% 
29% 77% 15 m. 23.2% 
38% 106% 16.6% 
